Profits Over Patriotism: Black Market Crime in World War II Sydney by Blum, Timothy
 
 
 
Profits Over Patriotism: Black Market Crime 
in World War II Sydney 
 
Timothy Blum 
 
Black Market Dialogue: ‘But I can’t pay for those on my husband’s service pay.’  ‘Then get out for those who will’.   
 
Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of 
 Bachelor of Arts (Honours) in History 
 
University of Sydney 2011 
  
i 
 
 
Abstract 
This thesis examines the multi-faceted phenomenon of black market crime in World 
War II Sydney.  Using previously classified archives, coupled with oral sources and 
newspaper articles I provide a complete survey of this phenomenon.  As a concept 
the black market was a social construct with a level of stigma attached to offenders 
that would not exist in peace time.  This was moral policing.  I begin by discussing 
the relationship between the geography and morals of the city.  Both women and 
men in Sydney related to the black market differently.  I outline and evaluate the 
official response to the problem.  I also examine broader community attitudes in 
relation to this issue.  The research provided here should form the basis for a more 
comprehensive understanding of white-collar crime and the moral regulation of 
behaviour. 
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Introduction 
 
There have always been a small number of individuals who have sought to profit out 
of other’s misfortune.  It could be a situation where a natural disaster has hit a given 
town with the survivors, to their horror discovering that enterprising merchants have 
overnight raised the prices of bare necessities; or an instance where an oil company 
which artificially reduces supply, thereby raising all prices.  The people struggling to 
come to terms with what has happened may view such conduct as profoundly 
immoral, but the merchant sees this behaviour as good business sense; simply 
reflecting the laws of supply and demand.1  This was certainly the case with the 
wartime black market in Sydney.  The introduction of coupon rationing in 1942 saw 
wide scale stockpiling of supplies as people sought to take advantage of scarcity by 
selling on whatever they had.  Prices had already been fixed at the start of the war 
under the National Security (Prices) Regulations and there had been isolated cases 
of overcharging, but it was not until full scale rationing that the government thought it 
may have a black market problem.  Throughout the war authorities policed the illegal 
trade with varying degrees of success, and at every turn it seemed that something 
thwarted them in their efforts: manpower shortages, allegations of corruption, vague 
legislation and what seemed to be the disinclination of the judiciary to impose harsh 
penalties. 
 
                                            
1 Stuart P Green, Lying, Cheating, Stealing: A Moral Theory of White Collar Crime, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), pp 96-7. 
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What is the black market?  How might the ‘black market’ be defined?  There have 
been many names for the black market each with its own emphasis, such as the 
‘informal’ or ‘unofficial’ economy, while the Australian situation saw its own 
definitions. The Army journal Salt referred to those involved as ‘Blacketeers,’ a 
combination of black market and racketeer but with stronger criminal emphasis.2  
Therefore we can already see that the black market was likely to change in 
definition, a point noted by S.J Butlin and C.B. Shedvin, official chroniclers of the 
wartime economy who argue that the definition used very much depended on the 
level of condemnation the media and government wanted to convey.  I feel however 
that the government’s own definition gives me licence to use the term rather liberally.  
Thus the 1942 Black Marketing Act, (which provided stronger penalties than existing 
legislation), defined such activity according to Butlin and Schedvin as: ‘virtually any 
transaction in contravention of price control, rationing (including petrol rationing), the 
various controls over production or, indeed, any economic control by regulations 
under the National Security Act.’3  In short the black market was as much a social 
construction as it was an economic system.  Thus when trading a neighbour’s eggs 
for clothing material or giving coupons to a friend was technically illegal, it was no 
wonder that most, including the legal community, took a far more restrictive view. 
 
                                            
2 Salt, 6/12/1943 
3 S.J. Butlin, & C.B. Schedvin, The War Economy, 1942-1945, (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 
1977), pp 329-30. 
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The wartime black market has received scattered coverage from historians, with 
Britain being the best served.4  Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska offers a useful survey of 
price enforcement but makes no discussion of buyers.5  Kassondra Hutchings 
attempts to analyse the entire black market but is short on specific details.6  A 
number of works also appear to confuse the wartime and post-war black market.7  
While they may appear the same, each was informed by a different moral context.8  
Thus, authorities were unlikely to view a black marketeer in 1943 Sydney the same 
way as they would in 1947.  It is true that Australia like Britain had rationing until the 
end of the 40s, but I feel to include the post-war black market in detail is beyond the 
scope of a 20,000 word thesis.  There has also been a general failure to integrate 
non-material concerns.9  The most comprehensive accounts are not historical but 
sociological.  Marshall Clinard’s excellent 1952 study of the US black market remains 
unsurpassed for detail and complexity.  Drawing on insights he gained as a wartime 
                                            
4 Popular histories include: Donald Thomas, The Other Enemy: Hucksters, Racketeers, Deserters & 
Civilians During the Second World War, (New York: University of New York Press, 2003); M.J. Trow, 
War Crimes: Underworld Britain in the Second World War, (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2008). 
5 Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska, Austerity in Britain: Rationing, Controls and Consumption, 1939-1955, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), chapter 4. 
6 Kassondra Lea Hutchings, ‘Moratorium on Morality: Rationing and the Black Market in Great Britain 
during and after World War II,’ (MA thesis, University of Arkansas, 2010). 
7 For example see: Zweiniger-Bargielowska, Austerity in Britain, chapter 4; Hutchings, ‘Moratorium on 
Morality’; Owen Griffiths, ‘Need, Greed, and Protest In Japan’s Black Market, 1938-1949,’ Journal of 
Social History, 35: 4, (2002), pp 825-58. 
8 I have found it useful to borrow from Philip Smith’s argument of war as a ritual.  Drawing on the 
ideas of Durkheim, he argues that the ritual of war is based on the distinction between the sacred and 
profane, which informs moral behaviour.  Thus on the home front we would have: patriot/traitor, 
volunteer/black marketeer, virtuous/greedy, moral/immoral, to name a few.  Philip Smith ‘Towards a 
Theory of War as Ritual,’ Theory and Society, 20:1 (February 1991), pp 103-38.; Anthony Giddens, 
Sociology, 5th ed, (Polity: Cambridge 2006), p 796. 
9 Hugh Rockoff, Drastic Measures: A History of Wage & Price Controls in the United States, (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp 173-4.  For examples of this see: Butlin & Schedvin, The 
War Economy 1942-45, pp 565-70; Zweiniger-Bargielowska, Austerity in Britain, chapter 4. 
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investigator at the Office of Pricing Administration and Civilian Supply (OPACS), he 
shows that most offenders were not large companies or organised criminals, as 
some have argued, but individual merchants with inside knowledge of the trade, and 
no previous conviction.10 
 
Australian coverage of the home front has always been patchy compared to the 
military accounts, and to date Sydney, (to name one example), still awaits a 
published account.11  Melbourne, Queensland and Western Australia have all 
received detailed coverage.12  There are also a number of general accounts of home 
front life, the most famous of which is Michael McKernan’s All In!, however like the 
more specific works, treatment of the black market is almost non-existent and almost 
all Australian histories have been guilty of lumping it together with other moral 
                                            
10 For an example of a study which views wartime price gouging and ration breaches as merely a 
corporate offence see: Edwin H Sutherland, White Collar Crime, (New York: The Dryden Press, 
1951), chapter 10.  On organised crime see: Alfred W. McCoy, Drug Traffic: Narcotics and Organised 
Crime in Australia, (Sydney: Harper Row, 1980), pp 161-7. 
11 Joan Beaumont, “World War II,’ in Graham Davidson, John Hirst and Stuart Macintyre (ed.), The 
Oxford Companion to Australian History, 2nd ed, (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp 699-
701; Kate Darian-Smith ‘War and Australian Society,’ in Joan Beaumont (ed.), Australia’s War, 1939-
45, (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1996), pp 55.  Sydney does however have an Honours thesis written 
by Rebecca Mann, ‘Thrills, Spills and Romance: Sydney’s Luna Park in World War Two,’ (BA (Hons) 
thesis, University of Sydney, 2010). 
12 On Victoria: Kate Darian-Smith, On the Home Front: Melbourne in Wartime, 1939-1945, 
(Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1990).  On Queensland: Frank McBride & Helen Taylor, 
Brisbane Remembers: The Home Front 1939-1945, (Brisbane: Brisbane City Council, 1995); Libby 
Connors, Lynnette Finch, Kay Saunders & Helen Taylor, Australia’s Frontline: Remembering the 
1939-45 war, (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1992); Kay Saundes, War on the Homefront: 
State intervention in Queensland 1938-1948, (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1993); 
Michael Sturma, ‘Loving the Alien: The Underside of Relations Between American Servicemen and 
Australian Women in Queensland, 1942-1945, Journal of Australian Studies, 24, (1989), pp 3-17.  
Western Australia: Jenny Gregory (ed.) On the Homefront: Western Australia and World War II, 
(Nedlands: University of Western Australia Press, 1996).   
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concerns, with little attempt at analysis.13  Kate Darian-Smith’s otherwise excellent 
account of the Melbourne home front devotes merely two pages in the entire book on 
the subject.14  In embarking on my research I also came across the considerable 
roadblock, being that with a couple of exceptions; mentions of Sydney during the war 
were almost non-existent from most local histories.15  Certainly there is more work to 
be done on twentieth century urban history. 
 
Few (if any), of the Australian histories which did mention the black market made use 
of the sheer volume of material sitting in the National Archives, and most of the 
documents which are presented here were declassified and opened for the first time 
to me for this thesis.  In embarking on my research I consulted the following Federal 
Departments: Prime Minister’s, Trade and Customs, Attorney General’s, and the 
Special Intelligence Bureau.  I also consulted the NSW Police Gazette at State 
Records NSW, where access was far more restrictive.  What began with one or two 
reports quickly became a never ending tower of paperwork: various communiqués 
between departments, allegations of corruption, and briefing papers filled the files.  
At times it certainly felt as though the departments concerned were, fulfilling some 
Kafkaesque nightmare, filing off reports to each other without any idea of what was 
                                            
13 For example see: Michael McKernan, All In!: Australia During the Second World War, (Melbourne: 
Nelson, 1983), chapter 9. 
14 Darian-Smith, ‘On the Home Front,’ pp 48-50. 
15 Most references were less than two pages, for example see: Shirley Fitzgerald & Hilary Golder, 
Pyrmont and Ultimo: under siege, (Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1994), pp 108-9; Shirley Fizgerald & 
Christopher Keating, Millers Point: the urban village, (Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1992), p 97-8, Chrys 
Meader, Richard Cashman & Anne Carolan, Marrickville: people and places, (Sydney: Hale & 
Iremonger, 1994).  An exception can be found in Memories: Kings Cross 1936-1946, (Kings Cross: 
Kings Cross Community Aid and Information Service, 1981); Peter Spearritt, ‘An Urban History of 
Sydney, 1920-1950,’ (PhD thesis, Australian National University, 1977), pp 113-132. 
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going on.  Of course many departments in this area had to be built from the ground 
up, and a level of chaos in wartime is certainly to be expected.  Thus my many hours 
spent at the National Archives and Australian War Memorial in Canberra enabled me 
to see far beyond the newspaper reports, and into the perspectives of the authorities 
and those citizens who wrote to Customs reporting such behaviour.  I aim to give a 
face to the black market. 
 
In this area, my research has only scratched the surface of what compared to other 
areas like foreign policy might seem small but can provide greater insight into not 
only social and economic relations, but the moral and regulatory framework which 
governed the Australian home front.  However a substantial part of my research is 
also based on newspaper reports, from the sensational Sun, to the satirical Smith’s 
Weekly, while, for contextual information the oral histories in the Australian War 
Memorial cannot be surpassed.16  This is because this thesis is not simply about the 
authorities, but how regulations affected the lives of everyday people. 
 
In forming my argument I have found it useful to refer to what legal theorist Stuart 
Green calls Sticky Norms.  These occur when:  
A gap exists between what the law regards as morally wrongful and what 
a significant segment of society views as such.  Here we say that the 
prevailing norms have not yet ‘caught up’ to legislation.  In other cases, 
                                            
16 Some of the problems with using wartime oral history have been covered in: Kate Darian-Smith, 
‘War Stories: Remembering the Australian Home Front During the Second World War,’ in Kate 
Darian-Smith & Paula Hamilton (ed.), Memory and History in Twentieth Century Australia, 
(Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp 137-58. 
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conduct is viewed as wrong but not so wrong as to justify criminal 
penalties.17 
The point is that the offence may not justify the penalty, which is certainly how most 
of the judiciary and defendants saw it.  Of course the penalty very much depended 
on a number of factors.  Both men and women had different views of such conduct; 
the former maintained a fixation with the illegal sector, while the latter felt that it was 
simply getting hold of the necessary items.  In the eyes of the public a soldier buying 
bottled beer and petrol coupons in Kings Cross was participating in the black market, 
but a local shopkeeper who stockpiled dress material or biscuits for a frequent buyer, 
was looking after the customers.  Perhaps Salt put it best when it stated at the end of 
the war: “There are no scruples in the black marketing business, so long as you play 
ball with the blacketeer and don’t mind being fleeced.”18  Most probably everyone 
used black markets at one time or another, even if only for a special occasion, but 
those who got caught or ripped off often cried the loudest.19 
 
The following argument is divided into a number of sections.  Chapter One deals with 
the geographic distribution of black market behaviour in Sydney and argues that 
coupled with a deeply anti-urban ethic the prevailing view was that this was most 
problematic in the city’s centre.  Those living close to the wharves at Millers Point or 
Woolloomooloo also had access to Allied supplies and a ready market, and with 
troops in New Guinea prepared to pay up to £30 for Scotch whisky, (the fixed price 
                                            
17 Green, Lying, Cheating, Stealing, p 24. 
18 Salt, 10/9/1945, p 15. 
19 Joanna Penglase & David Horner, When the War Came to Australia: memories of the Second 
World War, (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1992), p 199. 
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was £1/1/6) there were strong incentives.20  Those in the suburbs however 
participated in under the counter transactions.  Chapter Two discusses the response 
of authorities in combating the problem, and argues that the populace seemed to 
tolerate most instances, and the issue was regarded by most as concerning but 
certainly not to the scale of that in Britain.  Consequently, the cumbersome 
legislation proved difficult to enforce.  Chapter Three is a specific case study of a 
Lebanese born merchant, Simon Coorey who was charged on 15 February 1943 
with purchasing goods without supplying the required number of coupons.  Mr 
Coorey’s ordeal is interesting because it would have been impossible to conceive of 
such a case in peace time, and it shows in detail how the regulations worked.  
Chapter Four specifically analyses the moral position of the media and authorities in 
regards to such behaviour, and it argues that the conception of black marketing was 
in no way fixed. 
 
This thesis argues that the black market was more than an economic system but a 
social system in its own right.21  In reality the law is never black and white, but 
wartime brought the added dimension of prescriptive moral behaviour, with those 
who crossed those boundaries labelled as deviants or even traitors.  What a study of 
black market crime in wartime tells us is that despite the perceived ‘all in’ mentality of 
officials and certain historians, there was a double standard which applied to such 
conduct.22  Some people themselves were far from sure if their own behaviour was 
                                            
20 Salt, 10/9/1945, p 17. 
21 Griffiths, ‘Need, Greed, and Protest In Japan’s Black Market,’ pp 825-58. 
22 McKernan All In!; John Pomeroy, ‘Morale on the Homefront in Australia During the Second World 
War,’ (PhD thesis, University of Sydney, 1995), p 336. 
9 
 
even illegal and various excuses and definitions were made to suggest that the black 
market in its various forms was an acceptable part of everyday life.  The people who 
are mentioned in this thesis, (with a few exceptions), are not professional criminals 
but seemingly honest citizens.  Thus this study aims to prove two things: one present 
an historical analysis of white-collar crimes, which is certainly lacking; and two, 
discuss the relationship between the law and the regulation of moral behaviour. 
10 
 
Chapter One 
Mapping the Black Market: a moral geography of Sydney 
I did say [I’d ask Mrs Molesworth about coupons] and I was shocked to 
find that she now wants two pounds a page.  Thirty shillings was bad 
enough before...But two pounds!  It’s positively black market.1 
 
Geography was one of the main factors in the Sydney black market, as the shape of 
the city directly influenced the form that the sector took on.  Thus it was the centre of 
the city, the established working suburbs of Surry Hills, Pyrmont, Glebe, and of 
course, Kings Cross which seemed to feature most in reports of black market 
behaviour.  Of course the centre with its poverty and vice had long been regarded as 
morally suspect, and many enlightened planners, especially since the end of the 
Great War encouraged residents to move away from what they saw as the crammed 
and dirty Central Business District to the modern and essentially egalitarian garden 
suburb, which sprang up everywhere offering a clean and safe space.2  Some 
historians have even gone as far as to argue that the urban sprawl of interwar 
Sydney left a vacuum in the city centre, which was only filled by organised criminals 
and their associates.3  While this is impossible to quantify, it was certainly true that 
by the 1930s an ideological pattern had emerged, permeating popular culture with a 
distinctly anti-urban ethic in favour of suburban uniformity.4  We might think of it as a 
                                            
1 Two members of Sydney’s elite debate the ethics of buying coupons on the black market in Dympha 
Cusack & Florence James’ wartime novel Come In Spinner, (Sydney: Pacific Books, 1951), p 88. 
2 Salt: Authorised Education Journal of Australian Army, (hereafter Salt), 28/9/1942; Robert 
Freestone, ‘The Great Lever of Social Reform: The Garden Suburb 1900-30,’ in Max Kelly, (ed.), 
Sydney: City of Suburbs, (Kensington: New South Wales University Press, 1987), pp 77-95.  
3 Alfred W. McCoy, Drug Traffic: Narcotics and Organised Crime in Australia, (Sydney: Harper Row, 
1980), p 115. 
4 W.K. Hancock, Australia, 2nd ed., (Brisbane: Jacaranda Press, 1961, p 246. 
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distinctly doughnut shape: respectable in leafy Castlecraig and immoral in dirty 
Darlinghurst.   
 
From the outset we need to distinguish between two different kinds of black markets: 
one concerned trade in luxury goods, namely alcohol, petrol and cigarettes and was 
mostly the domain of men, and thus transactions took place in very male orientated 
spaces such as Kings Cross.5  Those involved were also more likely to be working in 
a syndicate, where profits as well as breaches of the law were much more 
substantive.  In contrast the second contained a higher involvement of women and 
consisted mostly of individuals hoping to purchase or sell small quantities of clothing 
material or fruit and vegetables; though there were occasions when the two 
categories converged.  The black market of alcohol, petrol and coupons was thus 
more likely to be associated with areas not only deemed poorer, but which were 
likely to experience an influx of Allied servicemen and foreign cargo. 
 
Life was certainly tougher in the inner city than it was in the suburbs, but we need to 
be careful not to brand all black marketeers as organised criminals, though some no 
doubt did exist.6  Marshall Clinard’s sociological research on the US black market, 
for example notes that the majority of offenders had no prior convictions and the 
                                            
5Geoffrey Bolton, The Middle Way, 1942-1995, 2nd ed., (South Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 
1996), p 12. 
6 Marshal Clinard’s research on the US black market found a concentration of convicted criminals 
working in the alcohol sector, and the Australian case is similar, with Tilly Devine and Kate Leigh all 
providing outlets for sly-grog.  See: The Black Market: a study of White Collar Crime, (New Jersey: 
Patterson Smity, 1969), p 296; (on Sydney), McCoy, Drug Traffic, pp 161-67; David Hickie, Chow 
Hayes: gunman, (North Ryde: Angus & Robertson, 1990); Penglase & Horner, When the War Came 
to Australia, p 200; Truth 7/2/1943. 
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Sydney case is much the same; those merchants closest to the demand sought to 
supplement their incomes, doing business on the side, and for them the war was a 
blessing. 7  In this chapter I argue that the introduction or wide-scale rationing in 
1942 provided the impetus for illegal activity, through the regulation of personal 
consumption.  However individual responses to the black market were divided not 
simply by geography, but gender as well.  The heaviest concentration of illegal 
activity was situated closest to the goods concerned, (i.e. the wharves around the 
harbour, and the small scale factories in South Sydney).  Therefore, we can already 
see that the informal sector was far more fluid that might have been imagined. 
 
There was also a strong difference in how men and women seemed to view the 
wartime black market.  Men seemed much more willing to talk openly about possible 
criminal behaviour they noticed, regardless of whether they were directly involved or 
not, which explains why much of the oral testimony on the black market comes from 
men. 8  Women in contrast seemed less inclined to discuss such matters, perhaps 
because they were less likely to be involved a serious racket, but also because such 
conduct seemed to be regarded as immoral.  The exception it seems, for women 
discussing the black market today is if they were children during the war.  My 
research so far has contradicted Sara Buttsworth’s assertion that female involvement 
                                            
7 I base this assumption on the fact that the Federal archives I examined contained a noticeable 
absence of the usual suspects (i.e. Tilly Devine and Kate Leigh), and the majority of the convicted 
appeared to have no prior convictions.  Clinard, The Black Market pp 296-7. 
8 For examples of men discussing the black market see: Interview with Ray Blisset, (VHS), (Australian 
War Memorial, 1992): F04055/1/3, F04055/2/3, F04055/3/3, (3 volumes).’; Memories, Kings Cross, pp 
108-10; Penglase & Horner, When the War Came to Australia, pp 199-201; Daniel Connell, The War 
at Home: Australia 1939-1949, (Crows Nest: Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 1988), pp 122-28. 
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consisted of ‘exercises in bartering,’ especially in relation to the garment trade.9  
Those located further away from the city often had the luxury of exchanging home 
grown produce, though this was technically regarded as black marketing.  Also, as 
Joy Finch has argued, the arrival of American servicemen introduced the new 
concept of the more consumer driven dating and femininity, rather than Victorian era 
courtship.  Thus lipstick, expensive gowns and shoes all became essential items 
when it came to securing a partner.10  In short the term ‘black market’ for most 
people meant criminality, and luxury goods, (such as perfumes, cosmetics, 
stockings, confectionary, alcohol, cigarettes and petrol), for which tax had not been 
paid. 
 
Men and women thus enacted with the city based on their own spatial conceptions, 
though these were by no means completely fixed.11  The sites of most ‘black’ 
transactions, in the dingy pubs of Glebe, or dark alleyways of Kings Cross were off 
limits to respectable women.  Men however had the fortune of having moral 
boundaries which extended beyond the suburban periphery and were thus able to 
indulge in the bohemian delights of urban Sydney; indeed such behaviour was 
                                            
9 Sara Buttsworth, ‘Women Colouring the Wartime Landscape,’ in Jenny Gregory (ed.), On the 
Homefront: Western Australia and World War II, (Nedlands: University of Western Australia Press, 
1996), (endnote 24), p 313.  For examples of female involvement, see: Letter from ‘Fairs Fair’ to the 
Hon. R.V. Keane, Minister for Trade and Customs, October 1943.  NAA: A1539, 1945/W/2671; 
Cusack & James Come In Spinner, pp 46, 244, 269; Australian Woman’s Weekly, 23/5/1942, 
15/6/1944; 10/4/1945; Sun, 10/9/1942; Truth, 3/1/1943; Sydney Morning Herald, 11/11/1943; Daily 
Mirror, 29/10/1943. 
10 Lyn Finch, ‘Consuming passions: Romance and consumerism during World War II,’ in Joy Damousi 
& Marilyn Lake (ed.), Gender and War: Australians at war in the twentieth century, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp 105-17. 
11 Tim Cresswell, Place: a Short Introduction, (Madden, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 2004), pp 27, 29-
30. 
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encouraged as a masculine virtue.  In one sense the black market was as much a 
social construction as it was an illegal system.  It is true there were also reports of 
organised rackets in female dominated field of cosmetics; however like the rest of 
the black market both buyer and seller simply viewed their activities as making the 
best of a bad situation. 12 
 
Until 1942 most Australians regarded the war as something ‘over there,’ and the 
general attitude of the population was summed up by the then Prime Minister Robert 
Menzies as ‘business as usual.’  However the increasing advance of the Japanese, 
especially after the bombing of Pearl Harbour in December 1941, brought a new 
reality home, that Australia would no longer be immune from the effects of war.  
Thus in order to cope with the mammoth war effort required, the incoming Curtin 
Labor government brought in wide scale rationing, which saw the introduction of the 
coupon system in 14 June 1942.  Prices had already been fixed as early as 1939 
under the National Security (Prices) Regulations, which attempted to maintain them 
as they were on the 31 August 1939.  Price control did not however entirely reduce 
the risk of rises, and throughout the war the government spent a great deal of time 
and money maintaining the system, and fighting inflation.13   
 
Upon presenting their Civilian Identity Card at any local electoral office, citizens were 
handed a ration book, a separate clothing card, and replacement, (due each year), 
                                            
12 West Australian, 5/9/1944; Cusack & James, Come In Spinner, pp 48, 50, 352. 
13 Marnie Haig-Muir & Roy Hay, ‘The Economy at War,’ in Joan Beaumont (ed.), Australia’s War: 
1939-45, (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1996), pp 115-6.  On inflation see, Smith’s Weekly, 22/8/1942. 
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which was dependent upon presenting the old one.  Once presented with their book 
people were free to spend their allotted points, (112 clothing), as they liked, although 
they would not be renewed until the following year.  Food coupons, depending on the 
item were renewed every two to three weeks, or longer on occasion.  For example 
coupons for sugar, categorised as a ‘B’ item were made available every two weeks 
in lots of two.14  Naturally, there were exceptions for invalids, expectant mothers, or 
certain industries.  Thus people soon learned to queue patiently every time new 
coupons became made available.  Stores which had new deliveries of supplies 
became a closely guarded secret, and it soon became apparent as the war 
continued that the list of restricted items would grow longer still.  As the Daily 
Telegraph suggested, striking a satirical note, ‘we can display the list prominently but 
how about the goods?’15  Tea and clothing were rationed from the beginning, in May 
1942, while butter was added to the coupon system in 1943 and meat in early 1944.  
Most items not already rationed were restricted simply by scarcity as shoppers 
watched in horror as the shelves became more and more empty, and with so many 
wartime restrictions in place, consumption became simply another dirty word. 
                                            
14 For tea, 2 coupons were made available every four weeks, butter, 2 ‘E’ coupons, (after 1944, 3), 
every four weeks, and meat, 4 ‘G’ coupons every two weeks.  Items such as petrol often required an 
individual application to the Liquid Fuel Board before being made available.  Rationing Commission, 
Departmental History: 1942-1950, (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1951), pp 
18-20. 
15 See Daily Telegraph (cartoon, 1945), in Peter Coleman & Les Tanner, Cartoons of Australian 
History, (Melbourne: Nelson, 1967), p 130. 
16 
 
  
[Figure 2]. The little book which caused so many problems: a ration book and clothing card from 1944.  
The lettered sections in the bottom right indicate specific categories of rationed items. 
 
The new rationing regulations were felt elsewhere in the community, as advertisers 
struggled to adapt to the laws in place.  The Sydney branch of J. Walter Thompson 
advertising firm had already felt the pinch when young staff rushed off to enlist, and 
by 1942 they were dissuaded against advertising rationed products; though such 
firms could get around this by creating goodwill or patriotic advertisements which 
seemed to have more in common with public relations than advertising.16  Matters 
came to a head in December 1942 when the Minister for War Organisation of 
Industry, John Deadman was accused of banning Christmas, by censoring all 
references to the festive season because it was believed that it encouraged wasteful 
consumption and had become commercialised.  Thus Father Christmas in an 
Anthony Hordens’ advertisement became an ‘old Friend,’ while the reindeer went a 
                                            
16 Rhiannon Davies, ‘Through Thompson Eyes:’ A Global analysis of Advertising in the J. Walter 
Thompson Agency, 1920-1945, (PhD thesis: University of Sydney, 2008), p 230. 
17 
 
similar way to be replaced by a fairy coach.17  In reply a number of irate citizens 
wrote into the Sydney Morning Herald accusing Deadman of stealing Christmas.18  In 
the end most people were caught somewhere in the middle, determined to have their 
Christmas, but without using all their coupons, and it was in these situations that 
many turned to the black market.  In this sense they were simply following the 
behaviour of some of the established department stores which had for some time 
crossed the line into illegality. 
 
The behaviour of some of the department stores was in a completely different 
category to the individual buyer and seller.19  Indeed while the buyer may have been 
looking for that extra item for dinner, and used a friend’s coupons, companies were 
out to profit.20  In October 1943, the Customs Department (which had joint 
responsibility for enforcing rationing), received a letter from ‘A Friend of the 
Government’, informing the minister of a black market in children’s furniture 
operating between a Rozelle carpenter and Anthony Hordens’ department store.  He 
noted:  
I know for a fact that a Mr Cyril Robertson... is abusing his Army 
exemption by being employed almost full time on his black market work, 
and using hundreds of feet of plywood in turning out 50 children’s sets a 
                                            
17 McKernan, All In!, pp 180-1; Davis, ‘Through Thompson Eyes,’ p 253. 
18 Sydney Morning Herald, 7/12/1942. 
19 For a theoretical study of corporate crime, see: David O. Friedrichs, Trusted Criminals: White Collar 
Crime in Contemporary Society, 3rd ed., (Belmont California: Thompson Higher Education, 2007), pp 
54-77.  For a specific focus on such behaviour in wartime, see: Edwin H. Sutherland, White-Collar 
Crime, (New York: The Dryden Press, 1951), chapter 10. 
20 White Paper on Black Marketing, 1945, p 2.  NAA: A670, Bundle 1. 
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week.  These sets are being finished in coloured lacquers (more black 
marketing work).21 
In a more cynical tone he added the following remark, ‘It would be very interesting to 
know just how much this firm owes the Taxation Department.’22  Clearly Anthony 
Hordens’ felt that the demand was there or they would not have gone to all the 
trouble to purchase them, and we do not know whether such items were sold under 
the counter or as legitimate items; plywood along with other building materials being 
frozen, the company risked a heavy penalty if they were found out.  Unfortunately the 
letter becomes rather vague on the exact quantities that went to Anthony Hordens’, 
listing the figure in the vicinity of hundreds, although it is likely given that they had 
already turned out more than 800, that Mr Robertson had more than one buyer. 
 
Anthony Hordens’ was far from the only company to attract suspicion for its trading 
practices, indeed Grace Brothers of Broadway also found itself subject to a report by 
an investigation committee.  A report tabled for the Interdepartmental Committee on 
Black Marketing in 1945 alleged that the company had attempted to conceal its illicit 
profits by undervaluing its shares since 1940, which by 1943 had grown to a total of 
£388,328.  Furthermore, Grace Brothers had failed to keep its records in order, and 
appeared to have misled investigators when they were accused of overcharging for 
items such as the men’s half hose, and, in a nod to the behaviour of Mr Robertson, 
the Tax department was very interested to find out exactly how much tax the 19 
                                            
21 Letter from ‘A Friend of the Govt.’ to the Hon R.V. Keane, Customs Minister, 19/10/1943.  NAA: 
A1539, 1945/W/2671. 
22 ‘Letter from “A Friend of the Govt.”’  NAA: A1539, 1945/W/2671. 
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shareholders had paid.23  Certainly in a period when profits were restricted to 4 
percent, excess profits would have stood out.  Relatively early into the rationing 
period the ‘Digger’s friend,’ Smith’s Weekly published an article questioning the large 
profits of certain companies:  
There are inflated items for out-of-pocket expenses for directors, 
depreciation and advertising.  There are significant entries for transfers to 
general or special reserve accounts, and transfers from these accounts to 
the loan accounts of individual directors.24 
Always leftist in outlook, but not anti-capitalist, the paper informed its readers, who 
consisted mostly of Australian service personnel that all was not well no the home 
front, and in this sense the idea that some people found themselves in a privileged 
position would not have gone down well with those defending democracy.  The war 
was for the people not for a privileged few. 
 
The unethical behaviour of a few businesses also attracted the attention of others.  
Dymphna Cusack and Florence James’ novel Come In Spinner contains a 
conversation between two wealthy businessmen who joke about how much money 
they have hidden from the Tax Department.25  However, despite the grandiose 
claims of a few, corporate involvement was never as large scale as it may have been 
in somewhere like Britain, where a larger population and a severe food shortage 
meant higher profits.  It should not be forgotten that the small size of the private 
sector in Australia was enough of a hindrance to prevent corporate profiteering 
                                            
23 Report to the Attorney General, February 1945, Interdepartmental Committee on Black Marketing, 
NAA: 11171844, 1958/22284. 
24 Smiths Weekly, 9/11/1942. 
25 Cusack & James, Come In Spinner, pp 316-17; Sutherland, White-Collar Crime, pp 170-2. 
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further spreading.  In Britain one form of this was when demolition crews (vital for 
clearing the damage from the Blitz) overcharged for work which was never 
completed, though there were many other schemes running as well.26  Early 
research in this area, such as Edwin Sutherland’s path-breaking sociological study 
White Collar Crime have tended to over emphasise corporate behaviour, which 
ignores the fact that the vast majority of offences were of an individual nature, rather 
than being company policy.27  Thus while companies in Britain, the United States, 
and of course Australia may have made the decision to put profits before patriotism, 
many others willingly turned their factories over to war production as a source of 
pride.  For the majority of Sydneysiders however, black market transactions were 
less likely to be made in expensive department stores, but in more mundane places 
for items like food or clothing material; in built up areas, often in close vicinity to the 
docks. 
 
Since the start of the war the government had grown increasingly concerned at the 
number of reported thefts occurring on the docks, and often in broad daylight.  The 
Sunday Sun, always up for a sensational story, quoted a local wharf watchman as 
saying the following:  
Bashings of men who would not be a party to the thieving are increasing.  
But the police are facing a tremendous task.  No underworld wall of 
                                            
26 M.J. Trow, War Crimes: Underworld Britain in the Second World War, (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 
2008), p 83. 
27 Sutherland, White Collar Crime, Chapter 10.  For a more comprehensive approach see Clinard, 
The Black Market. 
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silence was ever as thick as that on the waterfront: no grape-vine system 
of warning so efficient.28  
For dramatic effect the editors also included the following: ‘I have been threatened 
with cargo hooks – other men have actually been hooked.’29  Things were certainly 
bad at the docks, as Detective Constable Ray Blisset remembered of his days 
attempting to police the illegal trade around the harbour foreshore; the human 
conveyor belt became all too familiar as stevedores walked onto the ships, only to 
reappear with their ‘CSR suitcases’ (a sugar bag) filled with beer and other restricted 
goods.30  When ships from numerous countries docked in Sydney Harbour such as 
the British, Dutch, and French navies, they were all targeted to some degree; a 
favourite were ships from the US.  On one occasion a US servicemen attached to 
the Army Transport Service discovered a marine locker had been prised open and 
two propellers stolen, only to spot the missing items fitted onto a large yacht moored 
in Elizabeth Bay that same afternoon.31 
 
Other people found equally ingenious ways to make their fortune on the docks.  For 
example the Army Journal Salt reported a case involving a merchant seaman on 
shore leave (although it failed to mention exactly where or when), who was caught 
with a large quantity of jewellery strapped to his legs.  He was fined £300 and 
surrendered the goods, but a search of his cabin at the next port of call found 
another stash of jewellery, for which he was fined an additional £40 and ordered to 
                                            
28 Sunday Sun, 2/8/1943. 
29 Sunday Sun, 2/8/1943. 
30 ‘Interview with Ray Blisset,’ AWM: F04028/1/3. 
31 Eli Daniel Pots & Annette Potts, Yanks Down Under 1941-45: The American Impact on Australia, 
(Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1985), p 231. 
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surrender these goods as well.32  The problem as Blisset saw it was that no one 
knew what cargo each ship was carrying, because the first thing to be stolen on each 
vessel was the shipping manifest with details of everything on board.  Unsurprisingly 
he blamed the stevedores for the thefts, and argued that their union, the Waterside 
Workers Federation, (which encouraged industrial activity during the war) was 
nothing more than a front for organised criminality.33  Their industrial action alone 
would have made them unpopular with the broader community, and it was hardly 
uncommon for police at this time to be staunchly anti-unionist.  However, going back 
as far as the First Fleet, the Sydney wharves were regarded as morally suspect.  In 
his extensive history of organised crime in Sydney, Alfred McCoy likened its criminal 
structure to other port cities like Marseilles.34  However the stevedores had their own 
explanation for their constant pilfering.35 
 
The war provided a once in a lifetime opportunity for many of the working-class 
labourers on the wharves.  As Alan McMillan remembered:  ‘You’d get on a ship 
and... you’d say to the Chief Steward... “We haven’t tasted a tin of salmon for a long 
while...[He’d say] get a couple in your bag... and take them home.”  And that went on 
– wasn’t what you’d say stolen, it was given to you [my italics].’36  The people in the 
suburbs of Millers Point and Pyrmont were some of the poorest in Sydney, 
                                            
32 Salt, 10/9/1945.  See also: White Paper on Black Marketing, 1945, p 24.  NAA: A670 Bundle 1. 
33 ‘Interview with Ray Blisset,’ AWM: F04055/1/3. 
34 McCoy, Drug Traffic, pp 26, 98. 
35 Interview with Ray Blisset.’ AWM: F04055/1/3. 
36 Joanna Penglase & David Horner, When the War Came to Australia: Memories of the Second 
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surrounded on all sides by concrete, industrial waste from the factories and the 
stench of rotting fish from the nearby markets; it was hardly an ideal place to raise a 
family.  Workers may have been slightly better paid, because their occupation was 
viewed as vital to the war effort, and thus a protected industry, but wages were still 
leagues behind most other jobs.37  With the war on everyone’s doorstep people 
made do as best they could; Wentworth Park, and much of the surrounding area in 
Pyrmont was commandeered by the US military for barracks and storage purposes, 
(apparently guarded), but it must have been a constant temptation not to steal from 
them.38 
 
There was a ready market too.  Not far away from where Alan McMillan was helping 
himself to some tinned salmon, courtesy of the US military, Peter Theodore of Glebe 
was selling it on, making a tidy profit.39  Det. Const. Blisset was prone to over 
exaggeration, but it seems unlikely that all pilfering which took place on the wharves 
was for personal consumption.  It certainly did not help matters that the wharves, 
(because they were a protected industry) seemed to attract an unsavoury criminal 
element which had little interest in being sent to Darwin or New Guinea by 
Manpower.40  We do not know the extent to which organised crime had penetrated 
the wharves during the war except for the fact that it was undoubtedly more 
concentrated there than anywhere else in Sydney.  However the organised networks 
                                            
37 Shirley Fizgerald & Christopher Keating, Millers Point: the urban village, (Sydney: Hale & 
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on the wharves were not the only ones involved in the wartime black market, and 
police had particular difficulty locating sly-grog shops. 
 
The most sophisticated syndicates (with the possible exception of Grace Brothers) 
related to the illegal sale or supply or alcohol.  Consider the following report made by 
the Customs Special Investigation Section, a taskforce formed to look into large 
scale black marketing of alcohol which involved Messrs Kempley, Blank and Casey.  
Blank was arrested on 9 December 1943 on suspicion of black marketing activity 
between 1 May and 8 December 1943, and was finally convicted 3 March 1944.41  
Casey managed the Sussex Hotel, (owned by Blank), while Blank himself was 
proprietor of the Macquarie Hotel.  Mr Kempley, of Kempley, Wilde & Co., Public 
Accountants, did the accounts for both establishments.  After a long investigation 
involving more than 33 personnel from branches as diverse as the Commonwealth 
Security Service all three were arrested without warrant under the National Security 
Act, and a search discovered more than 450 bottles and 45 gallons of rum hidden on 
the premises.  Further investigations revealed that Cooper Nathan & Co., Spirit 
Merchants of Sydney had been illegally supplying alcohol above the price limit to the 
Darlington Hotel run by Kempley.  An examination of that company discovered a 
number of illegal transactions, (presumably in sugar) between the manager of 
Cooper & Nathan, William Christie, and a senior director of Colonial Sugar Refinery, 
E.G Claxton.  The illicit profits from the venture finally went into the coffers of The 
                                            
41 Telegram from J.B. Maher, Senior Exercise Officer, Department of Trade and Customs to Solicitor 
General’s Department, 9/12/1943; Memorandum for the Crown Solicitor, Attorney General’s 
Department, National Security Act, Section 13 – Arrest, 9/12/1943; Particulars Respecting Prisoner 
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Union Trustee Co., which in acting as joint trustee of the distillery seemed to display 
a remarkable turn in its finances.42  Thus we have a clear case of corporate 
sponsored black marketing.  However the vast bulk of cases which took up police 
time were of a far less extensive nature and, unsurprisingly many were clustered 
together in the inner city. 
 
The black market transactions which took place in The Cross and surrounding areas 
seemed to fit a general pattern of catering to the vices of a large number of military 
personnel on leave. 43  While at one end was the sophisticated syndicate of David 
Blank and his associates, at the other end of scale were the street cons of 
professional criminal, Chow Hayes.  What later became known as the ‘Cabbage 
Leaves Rort’ consisted selling American cigarettes around the seedy end of town, 
which despite their authentic labelling consisted of nothing more than collected 
cabbage leaves from Chinatown.  Hayes later alleged, (although there is no proof), 
that his team of grafters were pocketing roughly £8,000 a week from the scam.44  As 
Tanja Luckins has remarked that six o’clock closing laws introduced after World War 
I had the result of reducing public drunkenness.  This occurred when people sought 
refuge in buying bottled beer and the sly-grog shops that frequented the poorer parts 
of the city were hidden from public view.  Thus long before the introduction of 
rationing the pub had long ceased to offer any endearing qualities for most women, 
                                            
42 Memorandum Senator the Hon. R.V Keane, Minister for Trade and Customs, Agendum No.600-
Black Marketing Investigations, 30/1/1944, NAA: A270, 600.  See also ‘David Blank – Prosecution 
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becoming purely a male space, while the introduction of bottled beer increased the 
risk of domestic violence.45 
 
Throughout the war Customs and police had numerous reports of premises that 
seemed unable to supply alcohol during normal trading hours, though appeared to 
do a roaring trade well outside of these times.46  The difference between the sly-
groggers of the 20s and 30s and those during wartime was that many of the suspect 
establishments under investigation during the war were legitimate businesses as 
opposed to being derelict hovels consisting of nothing more than a few chairs and 
bottles of beer; though the latter certainly existed.  The influx of so many foreign 
troops also appeared to change drinking tastes, and apart from the staple of beer, 
(wine was regarded as suspect), whisky became enormously popular and prices 
quickly rose from the normal 25s to sometimes more than £3.  The vast bulk of 
supplies however were of dubious quality; the better at least used proper labels, 
while the worst consisted of wine, spirit or whatever was at hand.47  As Michael 
McKernan has pointed out anyone who was silly enough to believe that he, (it was 
almost always he), could purchase authentic Scotch during a war deserved what 
they got.48 
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The black market in alcohol got the most press coverage because it was viewed as 
the most immoral, especially in the context of six o’clock closing.49  However bootleg 
alcohol was not the only thing going on in the inner city, nor was such behaviour 
always confined to pubs.  Indeed, there are many reports of suspicious activity 
occurring in more diverse quarters like the late night cafes and street corners, where 
it was not uncommon for unscrupulous salesmen to offer anything from petrol 
coupons to bags of soap, much of which was sold onto unsuspecting American 
servicemen.50  Such areas certainly had a different idea of community as one person 
remembered, ‘You could buy anything you wanted to up at The Cross without 
coupons.’51  The wartime blackout although not as extensive as in Britain created a 
level of fear as whole suburbs became clothed in darkness, and drunken assaults 
were common, perhaps even more so as the restrictions on transport meant that 
many were stranded in the city.  Of course most people did not live in the Cross, 
choosing instead to visit it for own reasons.  With the restrictions on public transport 
(to conserve fuel), many found that somewhere during the course of the war they 
would have to deal with taxis, which made a unique contribution to black market 
culture. 
 
The war had a profound effect on the taxis of Sydney, and overnight it seemed that 
many had managed to transform themselves from being mere carriers of people to 
four wheeled grocery stores, offering everything from bottled beer to building 
                                            
49 See: Truth, 24/1/1943, 31/1/1943, 7/2/1943, Daily Mirror 1/11/1943, Sun 9/10/1943, 1/11/1943, 
16/11/1943. 
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materials.  Thus it soon became common for taxi drivers to be seen in the odd hours 
of the morning loading and unloading suspicious packages from the boot of their 
vehicles, to be sold on to a needy customer.  But why taxis?  ‘Dhas’ wrote into the 
Bulletin and described the following conversation between himself and the driver of a 
taxi which seemed to be full of blue metal, a rationed building material:  
Do you know what I have to pay for petrol on the black market [said the 
driver]?  Seven bob a gallon! ...new tyres cost me sixty quid on the black 
market.  Why don’t [sic] the Government let us have some tyres and give 
us 150 gallons of petrol instead of that ridiculous 75 that forces us onto 
the black market?52 
If taxis were forced onto the black market by restrictive rationing it certainly did not 
help matters that there were large numbers of US servicemen willing to pay large 
sums of money for whatever they could get.53 Nor should it be surprising that taxi 
drivers seemed well represented in syndicates dealing in petrol, especially when it is 
factored in that the returns were high, and public transport restrictions forced most 
people to pay for whatever transport they could get.54   
 
The wartime black market in alcohol, petrol and cigarettes may have been an 
exclusively male domain, but it was a different story with goods like dress material or 
fruit and vegetables, where women appeared to dominate most sales, with most of 
the men away fighting.  Many Sydneysiders found it difficult to maintain adequate 
supplies of fruit and vegetables, which the war had so drastically cut, and unlike 
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those in the outer areas or less established cities like Brisbane, there was little space 
for personal cultivation; perhaps another reason why the black market seemed more 
confined to the urban populace.  Instead most people had to rely on the local 
grower’s markets and barrow sellers who lined George Street where it was difficult to 
enforce price regulations.55  Here the spatial divide between genders was less 
noticeable because it was the women who did most of the shopping, and thus, it is in 
this area where most breaches involving women occurred.  As early as August, 1942 
the Sun ran a large story on the presence of a black market in potatoes existing in 
Sydney markets.  Potatoes had not yet been rationed, but it seems that demand had 
outstripped supply and some traders were taking advantage of the situation by 
raising their prices.56   
  
 [Figure 3] The potato reads ‘Black marketing, Food Supply’, 
Sunday Sun & Guardian 2/8/1942. 
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The complicity of vegetable traders in black market caused a stir in the media and 
the government.  Matters were hardly helped when the Sydney Morning Herald 
quoted the president of the NSW Fruit Shopkeepers’ Association one October in 
1943, as saying that ‘if fruit and vegetable shopkeepers did not trade on the black 
market most would starve.’57  Despite obviously reading the article, the government 
appeared to have ignored Mr Cook’s argument that the scarcity of goods meant that 
products were more expensive, meaning that the cost would have to be passed onto 
the consumer.  Indeed, the day after the publication of the article the Commonwealth 
Investigation Branch prepared a dossier on Mr Cook and the association and while 
they seemed to have decided not to proceed against him personally, it did not stop 
them infiltrating a meeting by the organisation held two weeks later.58  In fairness to 
the Commonwealth Police, the black market in fruit and vegetables was widespread 
and detection was difficult because a lack of investigators and few were willing to risk 
reprisals.  In the same period the Daily Mirror reported incredulously that 
greengrocers were charging up to a shilling a pound for peas.59  Similar 
investigations were also taking place in the clothing industry where it was widely 
reported that large quantities of illegal material were being sold. 
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Most ration breaches involving material were of the petty kind, but that did not stop 
investigators casting their eye over the entire industry.60  Many of the sellers here 
were hawkers of dress material which was sold onto small scale manufacturers 
mostly concentrated around South Sydney, while the buyers were those women who 
could afford the price, and were not content to have their sense of fashion dictated to 
by accountants.  Unfortunately a number of reports of this nature seem only to 
concentrate on the seller, and we have no way of knowing whether it was actually 
the buyer who reported the illegal transaction to the authorities and wished to remain 
anonymous.61  The following is a typical case, Louis Max Patmoy a pawnbroker of 
Castlereagh Street was charged with selling a leather jacket to a woman without 
coupons, unfortunately in full view of a police detective.62  While many buyers were 
urban women, and more than a few men unwilling to wear the Victory Suit, there 
were more than a few customers and tailors willing to take the risk.63 
 
As men and women behaved differently in the formal economy, so they did in the 
informal one.  The moral geography of Sydney would not allow women to participate 
in cultural pursuits in the inner city; instead respectable women were largely confined 
to the safety of the suburbs where there were far fewer reports of such activity.  This 
did not mean that they were not involved, far from it; women bought and sold 
                                            
60 McKernan, All In!, p 157. 
61 For example see: Memorandum from Rationing Commission to Minister for Trade and Customs, R. 
V Keane, list of all detected infringements over an 18 month period, 9/6/1945.  In NAA: A670, Bundle 1. 
62 Daily Mirror, 29/10/1943. 
63 Bulletin, 27/1/1943.  See also: McKernan, All In! pp 155-7; Sun, 27/7/1942; Truth 25/2/1945; Kate 
Darian-Smith, On the Homefront: Melbourne in Wartime, 1939-1945, (Melbourne: Oxford University 
Press, 1990), pp 35-37. 
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numerous items on the black market, but such behaviour was not viewed as black 
market, but buying the bare necessities.  Men as we have seen were much freer in 
interacting with the city, and thus a fixation with danger and vice encouraged forages 
into Kings Cross after brown-out looking for adventure.  For them knowing the black 
market meant knowing the city. 
 
Excessive consumption after the coupon system was introduced became frowned 
upon, although clearly felt there was a market for the illegal products they were 
buying, though this was kept quiet, for stockpiling was seen as going against the 
egalitarian spirit of making-do.  More items than anybody knew what do with, flooded 
the docks, and the areas around the harbour quickly became the site for numerous 
transactions in various black items.  In short, many of the assumptions governing 
black market behaviour were the product of an anti-urban ethic which had taken hold 
in the 1920s.  Occasionally the link between poverty and crime was proven, but often 
the offenders had no prior conviction and were generally inner city merchants rather 
than professional criminals.  This was a crime that permeated all aspects of society 
but appeared most glaringly in the inner city.  Thus as the war continued, the 
authorities found themselves again and again going back to the drawing board. 
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Chapter Two 
Policing the Problem 
There was a fellow called Peter Theadore, he had an extensive black 
market... in tinned fish and butter... he made a fortune.  He knew 
someone in the War Organisation of Industry...no doubt he spent a quid or 
two and he seemed to be able to get anything you wanted.   
Detective Constable Ray Blisset.1 
 
It was a constant source of concern to the mandarins in Canberra that large numbers 
of the population seemed to be completely disregarding the National Security 
Regulations.  By late 1942 the government had lost patience with education 
campaigns and began drafting harsher penalties, spearheaded by the indefatigable 
Attorney General Herbert Vere Evatt.  The new Black Marketing Act, which was 
introduced in September 1942, was meant to act as a deterrent to possible 
perpetrators and as Evatt himself noted largely covered the same ground as the 
existing National Security (Prices) legislation.2  Before this the Prices Commission (a 
division of the Rationing Commission which was charged with enforcing government 
policy), had to content itself with prosecuting only the worst cases of overcharging, 
which led to a high rate of convictions, (304 out of 314 prosecutions up to July 1942); 
but there was still a feeling that bigger fish were escaping the net.3  The introduction 
of coupon rationing earlier in the year had no doubt made matters worse, for now 
those who disliked the idea of saving their points for certain, (and most likely bland) 
                                            
1  
2 Evatt told Cabinet that the legislation was essentially the same but provided for harsher penalties for 
offenders.  ‘Minutes of Full Cabinet Meeting 22/9/1942,’ NAA: A2703, 32. 
3 S.J. Butlin, The War Economy, 1939-41,2nd ed, (Australian War Memorial: Canberra, 1965), pp 40-1. 
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items would simply shop somewhere else, regardless of the price.  Thus, the more 
enterprising citizens soon began stockpiling supplies in earnest.4 
 
The following is a discussion of local crime patterns during the war as well as an 
analysis of regulation procedures.  While S.J. Butlin and C.B Schedvin were no 
doubt correct in arguing that the Act was ‘more of a propaganda document than an 
effective restraint,’ policing the black market was a task done by more than the 
Attorney General’s Department and the Prices Branch, (a subsidiary of the Rationing 
Commission).5  There is no mention of the role played by the Sydney based 
Customs Taskforce, or the Commonwealth Investigation Branch, or other institutions; 
for regulating behaviour is more than simply making laws, it involves a complex 
negotiation of morals between the police and the policed regarding acceptable 
norms of behaviour.6   
 
There were many reasons for the lack of success in controlling the wartime black 
market.  For a start there were the severe manpower shortages leaving underpaid 
and overworked public servants to deal with what many argued were petty offences, 
                                            
4 Paul Hasluck, The Government and the People, 1942-1945, (Australian War Memorial: Canberra, 
1970), pp 273-5).  On the coupon scale for various items such as clothing and food items see: 
Rationing Commission, Departmental History: 1942-1950, (Canberra: Australian Government 
Publishing Service, 1951), pp 37-8, 83.  See also: Get the Right Angle on Rationing: Answers for your 
coupon queries, Commonwealth Rationing Commission, (Canberra: Australian Government Printer, 
1943). 
<http://www.nla.gov.au/apps/doview/nla.aus-vn5056727-p.pdf> (accessed 31/8/20111). 
5 S.J. Butlin & C.B. Schedvin, The War Economy, 1942-1945, (Australian War Memorial: Canberra, 
1970), pp 329-31, 564-9. 
6 On the moral dimension to white-collar crime see: Stuart P Green, Lying, Cheating, Stealing: A 
Moral Theory of White Collar Crime, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
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and hardly worth the effort.  Also, the speed at which wartime legislation was drafted 
meant that it was often unclear which government body was in charge, leading to a 
departmental double up, and often a level of bureaucratic rivalry.  It was always 
going to be an impossible task to regulate every wartime transaction and secure 
convictions against suspects, because despite what some critics said, the Curtin 
government was not a totalitarian regime where legal trials were for show only.7  
Even the Rationing Commission’s own history noted, ‘It stands to reason that it was 
not possible to police even a small portion of transactions in rationed goods which 
occurred every day.’8  The rather liberal interpretation of black market behaviour 
after 1942, as ‘any transaction in contravention of price control, rationing (including 
petrol rationing), the various controls over production, or indeed any economic 
control by regulations under the National Security Act,’ created a bureaucratic 
nightmare, as well as resentment within the judiciary and public service.9  As a result 
of this, corruption was a constant problem which added to an already growing 
number of woes.  However, Australia’s small population relative to food production 
and geographic isolation meant that it never experienced the large syndicates of 
Britain, and in the end authorities assigned a secondary status to the matter. 
 
The authorities seemed to believe that the black market was part of a broader 
increase in vice during the war and many blamed the number of people under arms, 
however by most standards crime actually decreased.  New South Wales for 
                                            
7 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 172, pp 975-1001, 145-82, Age 2/10/1942.  Cited in, Kate 
Darian-Smith, On the Home Front: Melbourne in Wartime, 1939-1945, (Melbourne: Oxford University 
Press, 1990), p 239. 
8 Rationing Commission, Departmental History, p 215. 
9 Butlin, The War Economy, 1939-42, p 330. 
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example saw an increase of assaults from 132.55, (per 100,000) in 1940, to 200.25 
in 1945, an increase of 67.710  Homicide, sexual assault, robbery, burglary, and 
drunkenness also experienced small increases relative to the start of the war.11  The 
exceptions to the rule are traffic offences, which is odd given the potential for road 
accidents during black outs.  However this is possible as many involved military 
vehicles and would therefore be out of civilian jurisdiction, and not be included in the 
official statistics.12  The other is larceny, which appeared to decline during the war 
years but the higher number of convictions secured suggests that authorities wanted 
to appear tough on crime regardless of numbers.13  The exception is drunkenness, 
which is rather surprising given the number of soldiers stationed in and around 
Sydney, but then many would have been dealt with by Court Martial, not local police. 
 
General figures however do not tell the whole story.  Absent (with the exception of 
drunkenness) are the perceived ‘moral offences’ such as abortion, prostitution, and 
most importantly for our purposes, breaches of the National Security Regulations, 
many of which appear in the New South Wales Police Gazette.  A study of the 
entries for 1943 is revealing, for it records an abnormally high number of arrests for 
moral offences like: rape, (including minors), desertion, bigamy, homosexual 
behaviour, and vagrancy.14  Unfortunately black marketing was regarded as a federal 
                                            
10 Satyanshu Kumar Mukherjee, Crime Trends in Twentieth Century Australia, (North Sydney: George 
Allen & Unwin, 1981). pp 69-70.  There is no specific data for Sydney. 
11 Mukherjee, Crime Trends in Twentieth Century Sydney, pp 65-7, 70-7, 80-4. 
12 Mukherjee, Crime Trends in Twentieth Century Sydney, pp 85-7. 
13 Mukherjee, Crime Trends in Twentieth Century Sydney, pp 77-80. 
14 New South Wales Police Gazette, (Sydney: New South Wales Government Printer, 1943), pp 395-7 
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crime, and state police did not as a rule enjoy enforcing such regulations, therefore 
offences in this category are not recorded.  Although there were a number of petty 
thefts especially around army bases and factories, in areas which would not normally 
see crime, it is possible that these were black marketing cases.15  Thus while there 
was a perceived increase in crime it provided the impetus for the Vice Squad and 
others to crack down on underground activity because the entire sector was thought 
to be a breeding ground for immorality but as we have seen time and time again the 
black market avoided any single definition of criminality.   
 
Local magistrates were far from pleased at having their courts invaded by individuals 
convicted on the growing list of national security regulations.  According to one 
estimate, out of the 135 cases deemed serious enough to be submitted to the 
Attorney General, 70 proceeded under the Black Marketing Act, while the remaining 
65 proceeded under the old Prices Regulations; although even then the conviction 
rate was in the vicinity of 60 percent.16  Statistical data in many cases is incomplete, 
most likely due to the failure of departments to cooperate.  The official statistics 
furnished in the 1945 White Paper on Black Marketing show much higher numbers of 
successful prosecutions.  From the introduction of the Act to November 1943 it 
recorded a total of 584, of which 266 concerned fruit and vegetables, 38 drapery, 78 
groceries, 6 metals, 28 liquor, 2 motor cars, 20 meat, and 166 miscellaneous.17  
                                            
15 NSW Police Gazette, pp 35, 209, 307, 350, 415. 
16 Butlin & Schedvin, The War Economy, 1942-45, p 568. 
17 Items regarded as miscellaneous included: bread, firewood, oils tobacco, matches, bags, furniture, 
and stoves.  Data which is incomplete from November 1943 to April 1945 brings the total to 2112 
cases, making it an increase of 72%.  This may have included arrests as well.  1945 White Paper on 
Black Marketing, p 8.  NAA: A670, Bundle 1. 
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However it is quite possible that the majority of cases were never referred to the 
Attorney General, or were not recorded as such.  It should also be noted that such 
figures are national which is unsurprising given that the black market was mostly 
referred to only in the broadest possible terms; nor did it make much sense for 
federal departments to create state or city based data, because that was regarded 
as a matter for the states.  In any case there was a general reluctance on behalf of 
the judiciary to impose harsh penalties on the populace, perhaps because in most 
cases the penalties far outweighed the crimes, and the situation at home was not 
regarded as serious enough for strong sentencing.18 
 
The judiciary however were not economists, and their own objections were based on 
the political nature of the laws which seemed to violate the Constitutional agreement 
of separation between the Executive and Judiciary branches of government.  In 
short, the idea that the government could influence legal judgements by imposing 
mandatory minimum sentences seemed wrong, and not even the wartime 
emergency could threaten the challenge to civil liberties, which we will see in 
Chapter Three.19  Therefore it was not surprising that many accused argued that the 
laws were a breach of judicial power and that ‘trap’ sales were morally suspect.20  
The Rationing Commission shared a different view on the matter, as the 
Departmental History noted ‘with one or two exceptions... magistrates did not 
                                            
18 Rationing Commission, Departmental History, p 216; Hasluck, The Government and the People, 
1942-45, pp 325-6. 
19 SMH, 14/12/1944; Advertiser, 14/12/1944; Argus, 14/12/1944, West Australian, 14/12/1944.  Copy 
of letter from J.B. Jackson to the Under-Secretary, Department of Attorney General & of Justice, 
9/10/1944.  NAA: A472, W16731 
20 David Blank, Notice of Appeal, 12/3/1944, p 3.  NAA: A472, W18006. 
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appreciate the real necessity for rationing, and the fundamental position which 
rationing controls occupied in the war effort.’21  Such comment seems to imply the 
rather odious charge of hindering the war effort.  As we can see the sticky norm of 
black marketing met with varied responses between those who viewed such conduct 
as illegal and immoral, (the Rationing Commission) and those in the judiciary of a 
more liberal persuasion, who viewed the problem as one of regulation.22   
 
Consider the case of Bondi butcher Adrian Jessup, whose ingenious plan to defraud 
the Commission out of 2,646 coupons consisted of submitting his old coupons to a 
bank, a requirement before the next years’ instalment could be issued.  However a 
closer inspection revealed the envelopes submitted contained mostly pieces of white 
paper cut out to represent coupons.  He was convicted on 12 October 1944 and 
fined £3, which the Rationing Commission was less than pleased about.23  Other 
cases seemed even pettier; Reuben Levitas of Pit Street was fined £3 for supplying 
articles of women’s underclothing at less than the required number of coupons.24  In 
this way the courts became tied up securing even the smallest case, meaning that 
much larger breaches could slip through undetected.  The establishment of a 
separate Special Court in Sydney which was (in theory) subordinate to the New 
                                            
21 Rationing Commission, Departmental History, p 216. 
22 Stuart Henry (ed.), Can I have it in Cash?: A study of Informal institutions and Unorthodox Ways of 
Doing Things, (London: Astragal, 1981), p 16.  Cited in Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska, Austerity in 
Britain: Rationing, Controls, and Consumption, 1939-1955, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p 
156.  See also Green, Lying, Cheating, and Stealing, p 1 and more generally. 
23 Briefing paper from Rationing Commission to Customs Minister, 9/6/1945, p 3: NAA: A670, Bundle 
1.  On ration book regulations see: Rationing Commission, Department History, pp 14-15, 30, 32; ‘Get 
the Right Angle on Rationing.’ 
24 Briefing paper from Rationing Commission to Customs Minister, 9/6/1945, p 2.  NAA: A670, Bundle 
1. 
40 
 
South Wales legal system, was supposed to reduce the backlog of cases however it 
led to more confusion regarding the role of the States in the process.  
 
As Kay Saunders has remarked on state intervention in Queensland during this 
period, the Australian War Book, which outlined the national security regulations: 
gave...due regard, (but did not define) the internal process of cooperation 
between the States and the Commonwealth...The expansion of the 
functions of existing civil departments was envisaged, though the specific 
features of this process were not described [my italics]25 
Perhaps it is unsurprising given that much of the bureaucratic infrastructure was 
created from scratch in a matter of weeks.  Paul Hasluck, in his capacity as official 
chronicler of the government during World War II also described the process of state 
involvement, but unfortunately his account suffers from a level of bland impartiality, 
and he restricts himself to noting that among other functions there would be 
cooperation between state and federal police forces and the Customs Department 
on issues of law enforcement.  He does however, note that more consultation should 
have taken place with the states, but does not say how this could have been 
achieved.26  Essentially the problem was that by copying a British system of national 
security regulations, which was not designed for a federal (state based) system, it 
caused more confusion in everyday lives, and made criminal detection and 
prosecution even more problematic. 
 
                                            
25 Kay Saunders, War on the Homefront: State intervention in Queensland 1938-1948, (St Lucia: 
Queensland University Press, 1993), pp 25-6. 
26 Saunders, War on the Homefront, p 4; Hasluck, The Government and the People, 1939-1945, 
(Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1965), pp 125-37. 
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The nature of black marketing laws meant that absolute proof was required to secure 
a conviction, which meant actually purchasing the products, through undercover 
‘trap’ sales, though such methods were frowned upon.27  In one example, a joint 
operation was launched between the US Provosts and the local police to arrest a 
woman charged with illegally supplying alcohol from her home in Bondi.  After being 
shown the house in question, US Privates Brown and Collidge, who appeared to 
know some of the soldiers billeted there, made a purchase of a number of bottles of 
alcohol, after which Collidge returned to the car while the police and provosts made 
their way into the premises.  After the woman was identified by Brown, the arrest 
was made by Constables Tomkis and Doerner of the Vice Squad.  When questioned 
the woman, (a Mrs Tarrant), denied any knowledge of black marketing liquor, though 
a search of the house turned up a large stock of alcohol.  When asked about this, 
she explained that the 234 bottles of alcohol, and small quantity of tobacco 
uncovered were the property of the soldiers who were conveniently away at the time 
and were due to leave Sydney the next day.  Private Brown confirmed this version of 
events and Mrs Tarrant was charged with ‘sly-grogging’ on 7 August 1944.28  
Certainly the presence of so many cashed up US soldiers on leave increased the 
black market problem in urban centres like Sydney, although as this case shows, 
there were instances when various departments could work together in stamping out 
the trade.29   
                                            
27 Butlin &Schedvin, The War Economy, 1942-45, p 565. 
28 Arrest reports by Constable Thomas G. Tomkis, and US Provost Private Brown 15/9/1944, 
19/9/1944.  Itinerary of seized goods resulting from the arrest of Nell Tarrant.  NAA: A1539, 
1944/W/2689. 
29 For other examples of American involvement in the local black market see: Sue Rosen, We Never 
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By October 1943 the Rationing Commission had finished its first review of black 
market enforcement procedures.  However, the fact that one was completed only a 
year into the legislation suggests that there was a feeling amongst policymakers that 
it was not working.  Among other things the report called for the scrapping of the 
Special Court, in favour of a Commonwealth Court which would remove the problem 
of state jurisdiction, and deal only with National Security breaches, an increase in 
staff to the Crown Solicitors Department in each state, and the revoking of bail for 
convicted offenders.30  Senator Keane, Minister for Customs and Trade who was 
responsible with the Attorney General for enforcing the regulations, noted the 
difficulty in catching offenders and called for the training of more investigators.  The 
editor of the Sydney Morning Herald agreed, arguing that ‘trained investigators... 
would not be long in picking up trails that are apparently so familiar to members of 
the public,’ however such a plan failed to mention where ‘trained investigators’ would 
come from.31   
 
Indeed, with such a severe shortage of labour, Manpower largely resorted to moving 
the largely female dominated workforce to the most urgent industry as it was 
needed, and rarely did a day go by when a Manpower investigator would not be on 
the lookout for war shirkers, which reduced the number of trained investigators even 
                                                                                                                                        
Robertson, 1966), pp 138, 152-3, 322.  E. Daniel Potts & Annette Potts, Yanks Down Under 1941-45: 
The American Impact on Australia, (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp 230-2; Memories: 
Kings Cross 1936-1946, (Kings Cross Community Aid and Information Service, 1981), pp 109,136. 
30 Sydney Morning Herald, 7/10/1943. 
31 SMH, 7/10/1943. 
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further.32  Doubtless to say, many of recommendations were never implemented, 
although as new information from London came to light it was added to the growing 
list of recommendations.   
 
From early on in the war, the Curtin government was keen to research the British 
response to the black market, and as a result the High Commissioner in London was 
given instructions to find out as much as he could and report on the matter.33  Most 
papers appear not to have taken much interest in the British situation until early 
1942, after which regular reports were filed by the Herald’s own correspondent who 
noted that food shortages had led to the creation of a wartime black market.34  
Certainly before this time the majority of the coverage was focused on the German 
situation, which was a direct result of Britain’s naval blockade.35  The correspondent 
argued that Australia had a unique opportunity of learning from Britain’s experience 
in dealing with the problem, and also, in a fit of national pride, noted that London 
newspapers ‘display prominently the news of Australia’s sweeping reforms’ though 
he was rather illusive in saying exactly where.36 
 
                                            
32 Truth, 25/2/1945, Peter Coleman & Les Tanner, Cartoons of Australian History, (Melbourne: 
Nelson, 1967), p 130. 
33 Cables from High Commissioner’s Office, London to Prime Minister’s Department and Prices 
Commission, 13-15/1/1943, 8/1/1943 9/1/1943, 4/1/1943, 3/1/1943, 2/1/1943 3/12/142.  NAA: A9816, 
1945/170. 
34 SMH, 27/2/1942. 
35 On the German black market see: SMH, 19/1/1940. 
36 SMH, 13/2/1942. 
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Official news took even longer, so much so that the Rationing Commission became 
increasingly concerned by the lack of replies from London.  Personal inquiries by the 
High Commission staff had already revealed that enforcement was even less 
centralised than in Australia.  Indeed, each department, (the Ministries of Food, 
Liquid Fuel, and Trade, which dealt with clothing) all ran their own investigations, 
sometimes at the same time.37  To make matters even more confusing each 
department seemed to have its own idea of what constituted black marketing, though 
the more serious breaches did include joint operations between police and the 
departments involved.38  With this in mind retributivist punishments, meaning 
enforcement through deterrence seemed the only possibility.39  Unfortunately the 
government was not to know the extent of the British black market for some time 
because an Australian request for black market data would have been unlikely to 
have been on the list of priorities to a nation that was experiencing aerial bombing on 
a daily basis.  It certainly did not help matters that in a fit of departmental 
stubbornness, the Board of Trade refused to furnish statistics to the Australian 
government, arguing that they would be leaked to the media, and when it finally did 
manage to submit its report, it was only a page and a half of the vaguest nature.40 
 
                                            
37 Cable from High Commissioner London to Prime Minister’s Department, 2/1/1943.  NAA: A9816, 
1945/170. 
38 High Commissioner’s Office, minute paper: black marketing offences and penalties in the United 
Kingdom, pp 2-15, 3/3/1944.  NAA: A1539, 1543/W/3525; Kassondra Lea Hutchings ‘Moratorium on 
Morality: Rationing and the Black Market in Great Britain during and after World War II,’ (MA thesis, 
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the black market see: Zweiniger-Bargielowska, Austerity in Britain, chapter 4. 
40 High Commissioner’s Office, minute paper: black marketing offences and penalties in the United 
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If we compare British statistics with Australian ones, it looks as though they were far 
more successful at stamping out the black market; however looks can be deceiving.  
For a start the much higher conviction rate, (in the vicinity of 90 percent) reflected the 
view of black marketeers as traitors to the nation.41  Also, the report failed to mention 
the number of reported crimes, and a high conviction rate looks much better than a 
list of potential breaches, which the Rationing Commission used.  Finally, the authors 
of the report were quick to remind the Australians that the British were on the whole 
very law abiding, which fitted with the general tone of attempting to make the 
situation look better than it actually was, for even in wartime the metropole was still 
viewed through rose coloured glasses.42 The British model provided a framework 
that was mostly unsuited to Australia’s system of government which made it all the 
more confusing.  It then became the job of the local enforcement agencies to make 
use of the report to tackle the growing problem. 
 
There was a definite hierarchy in policing the black market.  At the very top was the 
Security Service, followed by the Commonwealth Investigation Service, followed by 
Customs, the Prices Commission, (including affiliate organisations including those 
under the Rationing Commission), and finally competing for last place were the 
militia Provost Corps and the local constabulary.  The Security Service requisitioned 
staff repeatedly, but was more concerned with counter intelligence matters and 
                                            
41 High Commissioner’s Office, minute paper: black marketing offences and penalties in the United 
Kingdom, pp 2, 4-14, 3/3/1944.  NAA: A1539, 1543/W/3525. 
42 High Commissioner’s Office, minute paper: black marketing offences and penalties in the United 
Kingdom, p 1, 3/3/1944.  NAA: A1539, 1543/W/3525. 
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immigration clearance to have any effect.43  The Commonwealth Police, never 
sympathetic to the left, spent a great deal of time monitoring subversive associations 
like the NSW Fruit Shopkeeper’s Association, which it suspected of being complicit 
in black marketing.44  Customs however had made some inroads to the beer market, 
where Sydney was believed to be suffering the worst from the blight, and as a result 
as special investigation taskforce had been formed by J.B. Maher to prevent the 
trade from further spreading.45  As I argued in Chapter One Sydney’s moral map on 
black market behaviour generally followed a scale of being acceptable in the suburbs 
to being downright immoral in the inner city; and certainly there was a reluctance on 
the part of higher ranking police and intelligence officers to partake in any behaviour 
which would have meant associating with ‘criminal’ elements.  Thus what was 
acceptable for the working-class ‘plod’ was certainly not for the educated officer.  
Matters eventually came to a head when the Rationing Commission proposed the 
use of undercover operations and ‘trap’ sales to catch offenders. 46 
 
                                            
43 Letter to Secretary Attorney General’s Department regarding profiteering and black marketing, 
20/11/1943.  NAA: A472, W17131.  
44 Transcript by C.I.B officer of NSW Shopkeeper’s Association meeting, Sydney, 3pm 8/4/1943.  
NAA: A367, C53299.  Cable from C.I.B. Director to Sydney Inspector, regarding black marketing in 
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[Figure 4] All in a day’s work: grim faced Customs officers in Sydney inspect an illegal cache of 
alcohol, circa 1943. 
 
Civilian investigators meanwhile were mostly overworked, underpaid clerks, who no 
doubt harboured some resentment at being consigned to the home front, where the 
lack of military uniform meant that their efforts were unlikely to be recognised.  Petty 
and often officious, it was to these public servants that the task of compiling reports 
and carrying out investigations on suspects fell, and it was little wonder that 
corruption was a constant concern.  However it was often the chronically 
understaffed local police which had to make most of the arrests. 
 
The local police had been hardest hit by the war, because despite being a protected 
industry many officers rushed to enlist in the AIF, while those who were left were 
often requisitioned by other departments such as the Security Service, who were 
often unwilling to return them.  The pay was low, the shifts were long, there was a 
never ending number of cases to investigate, and little recognition from the general 
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public.  In a rather self serving statement, Ray Blisset, a Detective Constable based 
in Glebe during the war, claimed that “we were treated worse than the Arnhem Land 
blacks.”47  While Blisset was unlikely to have ever visited an Arnhem Land 
reservation, the fact was that the many suspects selling rationed goods out of the 
boot of their taxi, (as we saw in Chapter One), made policing the home front even 
more difficult.  However while the NSW police had numerous failings in dealing with 
the black market the most serious of those, (which often involved corruption) affected 
the militia Provosts. 
 
Unlike the AIF many recruits in the militia Provost Corps were not of high quality; 
having been picked for their size rather than intellect, often having been former 
boxers and wrestlers.48  After the bombing of Darwin, Militia police directed large 
scale pillaging operations and Sydney was certainly not immune with a number of 
MPs convicted for theft in 1944.49  As early as 1940 they were widely despised for 
both their excessive violence and for having the unenviable task of breaking up the 
numerous sly-grog shops where many troops on leave were a popular sight.50  One 
recruit based in Sydney during the war remembered that police were spread so thin, 
that in theory the Provosts were supposed to assist with duties, but often they spent 
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also: F04055/1/3, F04055/2/3, (3 volumes). 
48 Glen Wahlert, The Other Enemy: Australian Solders and the Military Police, (South Melbourne: 
Oxford University Press), p 117. 
49 Wahlert, The Other Enemy, p 119.  On military crime more generally see: Anthony Buckingham, 
‘Military Crime During WWII,’ Australian Police Journal,’ 63 (1), (March 2009), pp 39-45.  American 
Provosts were also involved in the black market, see: AWM, ‘Interview with Ray Blisset,’ F04055/2/3.  
See also: Daily Mirror 1/11/1942. 
50 Wahlert, The Other Enemy, p 132. 
49 
 
much of their time patrolling Central Station and attempting to break up fights.51  
Therefore little help could be expected from an incompetent force that on many 
occasions seemed to blur the line between law enforcement and criminality, but they 
were far from being alone it seems, in helping themselves to the proceeds of crime if 
the opportunity arose. 
 
 
[Figure 5]  A soldier explains to his colleague that his apparent purchase of black market beer is really 
kerosene, by proceeding to light a lamp with the contents of the drum.  The caption reads: ‘Perhaps 
that’ll make you fellers a little more careful.’  Salt 27/9/1943. 
 
Allegations of corruption were to reach as high as the Commonwealth Investigation 
Service.52  The C.I.S. had for some time been investigating a garment syndicate 
operating between Victoria and Sydney, where middle men would purchase large 
quantities of woollen fabric direct from the mills and then sell the material on to 
manufactures and retailers in the major cities.  Harry Carr, (real name Laib 
                                            
51 John Jeffcote, ‘Confessions of a Provost,’ (unpublished memoir, Australian War Memorial, 
Canberra), MSS1046. 
52 Confusingly the CIS also referred to itself as the Commonwealth Investigation Branch, Bureau, or 
simply Investigation Branch. It should not be confused with the NSW Criminal Investigation Branch, of 
the NSW Police Force. 
50 
 
Kuczskynski) was singled out for investigation by G.M.B Longmore of the C.I.S, 
Prices Commission (which enforced rationing regulations), and Taxation Department 
in connection with the wool trading syndicate.  However midway through the 
investigation, after the arrest of Mr Carr the Taxation Department cabled the C.I.S 
with some troubling news, alleging that an investigating officer from the 
Commonwealth Police: 
Commented on the activities of a senior taxation official... was on familiar 
terms with the alien... that... [the] officer told Carr not to worry about the 
inquiry... That as a senior Taxation Investigator, Mr White, failed to get 
evidence, he did not see how he could be expected to be successful.53 
In a number of furious replies to the director of the C.I.S Mr Longmore denied all the 
accusations levelled against him.  He pointed out that the delay between examining 
the Carr file and acting on it was the result of a full caseload, and pointed out that the 
only major inquiries he undertook involved a Mr Frumar of Pitt Street.  He 
categorically denied meeting with Mr Carr and stating that the case file was ‘floating 
backwards and forwards between Canberra and Sydney’ and instead argued that the 
accusations were cooked up by Mr Frumar’s solicitor.54  However an internal 
investigation found that inquires regarding Frumar, would also mean meeting Mr 
Carr.55 
 
The final outcome of the investigation is unknown, however the secretary of the C.I.S 
argued for details of the accusation, including the name of the informant to be 
                                            
53 Memorandum for Acting Inspector, Commonwealth Investigation Branch from Acting Deputy 
Inspector, Tax Office, 25/1/1944.  NAA: A367, C53299. 
54 Letter to Inspector C.I.B. Sydney: alleged black marketing in woollen goods by Polish refugees and 
others, 26/1/1944; Letter to Inspector C.I.B. Sydney, 28/1/1944.  NAA: A367, C53299.  
55 Memorandum for Inspector, C.I.B. Sydney, regarding Harry Carr, 8/2/1944.  NAA: A367, C53299.  
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furnished, in accordance with the rules of British justice, and it seems most likely that 
whatever decision was reached regarding Mr Longmore’s conduct was done so 
internally.  This case also demonstrates that the undercover methods were regarded 
on all sides as suspect.  The failure to arrest the sellers on this occasion, (the mill 
owners), coincided with the general difficulty in prosecuting parties, (the buyer and 
the seller) and meant that some escaped.  The end result of the Carr investigation 
was that the nature of the information supplied would not be suitable for 
prosecution.56  Of course it should be noted that even the biggest black market 
scandal paled in comparison with the problems in Britain, where even the higher 
echelons of government seemed to be involved.  The Ministry of Food had already 
been in hot water in October 1941 when it was revealed that food supplies destined 
for hospitals and military canteens had been sold on to racketeers, when through a 
clerical error they had been marked as surplus.  Things were worse in December 
when it was revealed that Ministry of Food officials had been deliberately diverting 
meat supplies and pocketing the profits.57  Thus while Australia had its enterprising 
crooks, no one was trading in assets to the value of £21,000 as one seller of tinned 
salmon was in Britain.58 
 
Policing is not just the domain of the officials; it is also a role of the broader public in 
maintaining the correct moral standards which are especially important in wartime, 
                                            
56 NSW Prices Branch, Black Marketing Act: woollen piece goods, (undated), p 1.  NAA: A367, 
C53299.  For other examples of corrupt conduct involving the black market see: Day, Contraband and 
Controversy, p 244; SMH, 8/101942, 23/7/1943, 12/7/1944. 
57 Thomas, The Enemy Within, pp 133-4. 
58 Minute Paper: Black Market Offences and Penalties in United Kingdom, 3/3/1944, p 2.  NAA: 
A1539, 1543/W/3525. 
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and from the media we can learn a great deal about community attitudes in this 
period.  Thus the media and the public also offered suggestions on enforcing the 
problem.59  Indeed, many of the archives contain large numbers of letters written by 
members of the general public, as well as specific interest groups on possible 
breaches of the laws.  For example Mr Power of Cremorne informed Senator Keane 
that the branch manager of Motor Funerals, going by the rather appropriate 
pseudonym of ‘Dead Bodies’ was illegally selling butter.60  Mr A Denner, of Bexley 
complained that the practice of charging firms £50 for reporting the illegal 
transactions of rival businesses was a disincentive, and left them open to reprisals.   
 
From a more unlikely corner came the idea of a public awareness campaign in the 
media; the brainchild of the Women’s Committee of the Communist Party, and there 
were also those who had an interest in the process such as the ALP and the United 
Licensed Victuallers Association, (which was an umbrella lobby group for brewers).61  
Contrary to popular wisdom, the ULVA argued that the unpatriotic problem of sly-
grog would be solved by increasing the supply of liquor to affected areas.62  However 
with so many drunken servicemen in and around the city, it was unlikely to be 
accepted even if locals could not get access to beer themselves.63  The moralistic 
                                            
59 For example reacting to the black market in fruit and vegetables, the Housewives Association 
instituted a boycott of ‘one vegetable each fortnight if high prices continue’.  SMH, 17/6/1943. 
60 Letter from M. Power to Customs Minister, (undated).  NAA: A1539, 1945/W/2671. 
61 Letter to Customs Minister from Women’s Committee, Communist Party of Australia, 18/10/1943.  
NAA: A1539, 1945/W/2671. 
62 Sun, 1/11/1943; Spirit Merchants’ Association of Australia, report to Customs Minister on Control of 
Liquor Order, 25/12/1943.  NAA: A1539, 1945/W/2671. 
63 On lack of beer for civilians see: Letter from H. Ferry to Customs Minister, 21/6/1943.  NAA: A472, 
W16722. 
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Sun applauded the efforts to stamp out the ‘growing evil,’ while the Daily Mirror, in a 
more satirical fashion suggested that the ULVA ‘can’t see for looking.’64  Thus as we 
have already seen in chapter one, the inner city was already seen to be suffering a 
lack of morality. 
 
For regulatory authorities, the Sydney black market was very much a many headed 
Hydra; the prosecution of one group meant that many would take their place.  
However by and large, the local market was not completely dominated by organised 
crime and the majority of offences appear to be opportunistic more than anything 
else.  Many of the suggestions levelled at the government were to regulate sales 
during wartime, such as a compulsory statuary declaration for all second hand 
vehicles sold, which is perhaps a reason why conviction rates here were the 
lowest.65  The judiciary and police found themselves swamped with a never ending 
number of cases, and the lack of cooperation between departments as well as the 
cynicism of judges meant that many penalties were low.   
 
There was also strong demand for illicit goods from the better paid US troops, while 
low morale among law enforcers coupled with the difficult task of catching criminals 
in the act meant that many investigators were open to corruption.  The public did 
inform on known black marketeers, but the lack of manpower made it difficult to 
follow up cases adequately.  While the problem was never at any stage as bad as it 
                                            
64 Sun, 9/11/1943, Daily Mirror, (cartoon), 4/11/1943. 
65 Agendum for Customs Department: Black Marketing-Motor Vehicles, 31/4/1945.  NAA: A1539, 
1945/W/1955. 
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was in Britain, cases of black marketing continued until the end of rationing in 1950.  
In short, while it was a moral concern it was never bad enough to cause demand for 
a full inquiry and for most people it became a general annoyance of home front life. 
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Chapter Three 
Mr Coorey’s Court Case: a story of moral crisis and women’s undergarments  
 
Well, it was all black market, we knew that; but you asked no questions 
got told no lies sort of thing; everybody knew it was going on.   
Alan Macmillan, Sydney dock worker.1 
 
I begin here with what at first might seem a mundane court case during wartime 
Sydney.  However a closer reading provides a great deal of insight into the Sydney 
black market, as well as providing an absurd story which takes us from the Court of 
Petty Sessions in Martin Place, to the corridors of power in Canberra and back.  The 
facts of the case are these: Mr Simon Coorey of 157 Elizabeth Street, Redfern was 
charged with on 15 February 1943 with purchasing goods, (textiles) without the 
required number of coupons being supplied.  More specifically Mr Coorey made a 
number of cash purchases and took delivery of a large quantity of damaged 
women’s undergarments for which he argued a certificate of business registration 
was sufficient in place of ration coupons.  Despite repeated requests by General 
Textiles Pty Ltd for the remaining balance of coupons to be paid, the final instalment 
did not arrive until the authorities, being the Rationing Commission had been 
notified.2  Mr Coorey’s wife Martha, the registered owner of the ‘Maker-up’ 
establishment, as well as Nackley Succar, a local hawker were also arrested but 
were later released.  It was also alleged that such goods were being sold on to the 
                                            
1 Joanna Penglase & David Horner, When the War Came to Australia: Memories of the Second World 
War, (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1992), p 199.  See also chapter 1. 
2 Sydney Morning Herald, 27/6/1944, Canberra Times, 27/6/1944; SMH, 12/7/1944; Transcript of His 
Honour Judge Markell, Quarter Sessions Appeals Court, regarding Simon Coorey 27/6/1945, pp 3-4.  
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hawker, Mr Succar without the required number of coupons being surrendered.3  All 
defendants were of ethnic Syrian heritage.   
 
The argument which follows is that Mr Coorey’s behaviour was very much typical of 
the ambivalent attitude which surrounded the wartime black market.4  A level of black 
marketing was generally accepted by the Sydney populace, for such people were 
after all, providing a service, but if too much attention was drawn, the result would be 
open condemnation.5  Certainly compared to some of the large scale syndicates 
operating during the period, Mr Coorey’s case was a trivial one, but it also shows 
how authorities failed to discern between serious and minor breaches of the rationing 
regulations.  In the end the stress of the court battles, the extensive legal fees, and 
guilty verdict proved almost too much, and in mid 1945, halfway into his three month 
sentence he fell gravely ill, (at 67 years of age) only to recover some weeks later 
after his release, on medical grounds.6  Thus the accusation of black marketing in 
wartime Sydney was more than enough to bring down an individual.  The textiles and 
garment industry in Sydney was largely dominated by migrants, and it is therefore 
unsurprising that we should see certain groups, (Jews are another example), 
overrepresented in black marketing reports in this sector.  However the authorities 
                                            
3 Memorandum from Deputy Crown Solicitor to Deputy Director of Rationing, Rationing Commission 
regarding the prosecution of Nackey Succour, Simon and Martha Ivy Coorey, 12/10/1943 pp 1-3.  
NAA: A472, W16731. 
4 Michael McKernan, All In!: Australia During the Second World War, (Melbourne: Nelson, 1983), p 
250. 
5 S.J. Butlin & Boris Schedvin, The War Economy, 1942-1945, (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 
1977), p 569. 
6 Cable from Attorney General authorising the remittance of Simon Coorey on medical grounds, 
19/9/1945.  NAA: 472, W16731; Hazel Croal, Understanding White Collar Crime, (Buckingham: Open 
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were more interested in occupational criminality; that is crimes related to certain 
sectors, than perusing any one group.7  Thus the role race played in the outcome of 
this case and others like it seems minimal at best.  Finally it is important to add that 
in no way was this case different to any of the other black marketing actions 
launched by the government during the war.  Rather it is a typical example of the 
sticky norms that operate between the regulation of behaviour and criminality. 
 
Despite being referred to as ‘Syrian’ in court documents, Mr Coorey and his 
associates were actually of Lebanese origin.  As Paul Convy and Helen Mansour 
have pointed out, Syrian was essentially a blanket term for the area around Lebanon 
which had been under Ottoman rule for more than three hundred years, and most 
minorities hardly welcomed such a name which ignored their individual culture and 
traditions. 8  Most had come to Australia from the 1870s by mistake thinking they 
were in America, and hoped to escape increasing economic hardship at home.9  A 
typical migrant like Mr Coorey, (though we cannot be certain), was a small scale 
Maronite mountain farmer and cultivator of silk, which was then sold onto the 
demanding European market and by the late nineteenth century much of Lebanon 
was a rather cosmopolitan affair, with many merchants doing increasingly well out of 
                                            
7 Croal, Understanding White Collar Crime, p 162. 
8 Helen Mansour and Paul Convy, ‘Lebanese,’ Dictionary of Sydney, (2008), 
<http://www.dictionaryofsydney.org/entry/lebanese?zoom_highlightsub=lebanese> (accessed 
13/6/2011).  See also Ghassam Hage, ‘Lebanese,’ in James Jupp (ed.), The Australian People: An 
Encyclopaedia of its People and their Origins, (2nd ed.), (Oakleigh: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), pp 554-61; Paul Convy, The Lebanese Quarter Redfern: time, place and extent, (Coogee: 
Australian Lebanese Historical Society, 2008). 
9 Hitti, Lebanon in History, pp 475; Hage, ‘Lebanese,’ p 555. 
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the trade.10  However a number of combined factors hit the mountain farmers 
hardest such as overpopulation, overgrazing and the introduction of cheap European 
manufactured goods forced many to migrate.11  Those who arrived in the new world, 
never completely severed contact with their homeland, as many attempted to make 
enough money to send home for their families, and considerable sums flowed 
homeward to provide for new housing and such. 12  Others, when they were well 
established, would send for their families to accompany them in the new land.13   
 
With few skills and no firm grasp of English, many found it difficult to gain 
employment, and as a result, clung together to form ethnic enclaves which would 
offer some sort of support.14  At the dawn of Federation specific communities began 
to form, the largest, (and most important for our purposes) was in Redfern where 
migrants soon found employment as shopkeepers and hawkers; and would no doubt 
have traded with the Chinese and Jewish who occupied similar parts of the city.  
Another key feature of this community was the reciprocal business arrangement 
between the hawkers and the dealers; who provided the latter with goods, 
                                            
10 Fatma Müge Göcek Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of the East: Ottoman Westernization and 
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(particularly drapery), which would be sold on, dividing the profits.15  Such 
businesses were concentrated along Elizabeth Street, which by this time was 
referred to as ‘Little Syria’, though the population of Redfern was still overwhelmingly 
Anglo-Australian.  However it should also be noted that despite this name, the 
Lebanese community was rather fractured along religious lines, which prevented the 
establishment of a cohesive identity; and central to this was the tension between 
Orthodox and Catholic Christians.  While this was not the open sectarian violence 
which would engulf Lebanon in later years, it did mean that business practices and 
family ties were likely to be separated along religious lines.16 
 
‘Little Syria’ was already well past its prime when war hit Sydney as the successful 
business owners had already vacated the area in the 1920s and 30s for the more 
affluent Eastern Suburbs, when the Depression provided a second shock.17  Thus, 
as has been argued in chapter one, the anti-urban ethic of the city meant that inner 
areas like Redfern were regarded as morally suspect and linked with vice and 
criminality.  Simon Coorey seems typical of this migration pattern, rewarded by the 
Redfern Municipal Council, along with six others in 1909 for contributions to the area; 
by 1936 he had already relocated to suburban Randwick, maintaining the Elizabeth 
Street premises as a business only.18  Thus in regards to demographic shifts the 
                                            
15 Hage, ‘Lebanese,’ pp 555-6, Convy ‘The Lebanese Quarter,’ pp 7-8.  On community solidarity 
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more affluent were not out of step with the broader Anglo-Australian abandonment of 
the urban in favour of the suburban.  As Philip Hitti has remarked on the identity of 
Lebanese migrants:  
With no strong nationalistic feeling of the modern variety, emigrants had 
no insurmountable difficulty in acquiring the feeling of ‘at homeness’ 
wherever they went.  Their versatility and adaptability helped them to 
become ‘all things to all men.’  In Egypt they became Egyptians, in France 
Frenchmen... all before they had ever become Lebanese.  While at home 
they thought of themselves as Beirutis... or as Maronites, Druzes, [or] 
Greek Orthodox.19 
Certainly this was a community which strove to assimilate into Australian culture and 
were at great pains to stress their Caucasian heritage and one particular form this 
took was for the community to identify itself, stressing their European lineage.20  In 
the background of restricted immigration it paid not to draw attention to one’s race. 
 
Despite his pleas as an honourable man, this was far from Simon Coorey’s first time 
in court.  Indeed the pages of the Sydney Morning Herald are littered with references 
to legal matters involving Mr Coorey, which suggest dubious business practices.  
Most involved fellow Lebanese traders, but some even included business disputes 
between his immediate family, while the sums being argued over could hardly be 
called trivial. 21  However, whatever money Mr Coorey did have at his disposal was 
soon gone by 1936, when he and his wife filed for bankruptcy.22  Of course this is to 
                                            
19 Hitti,Lebanon in History, p 476. 
20 Hage, ‘Lebanese,’ p 555; Convy, The Lebanese Quarter, p 22. 
21 In reply to an alleged breach of an ownership settlement, his brother Anthony Coorey sought an 
injunction excluding him from a 50 mile radius of Redfern, see: SMH, 28/11/1919, 14/12/1918.  For 
other legal disputes, see: SMH, 22/11/1928; 28/3/1931; 22/3/1933. 
22 SMH, 31/1/1936. 
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some degree understandable given the severity of the Great Depression in Australia 
which was responsible for numerous business closures.  His own bankruptcy did not 
stop him being the star witness and translator in another bankruptcy case, which 
certainly suggests that he commanded much respect within the court and indeed the 
local community, no doubt helped by his brother’s position as head of the Lebanese 
Maronite Society.23  Coorey, given his constant legal actions certainly viewed himself 
as an important person.  Certainly he was important enough to be included on the 
guest list for the French Consul’s Bastille party in 1927.24  Already, we get the picture 
of someone who was no stranger to having his name in the paper. 
 
In his study of white collar crime, sociologist David Freidrichs points out that many 
offenders avoid presenting themselves as criminals, and such behaviour was 
certainly true of Mr Coorey who went out of his way to present himself as an honest 
businessman.25  The sticky norm of black marketing was more problematic in 
wartime because the accused had the added stigma of being accused as a traitor to 
the war effort.26  Thus when Mr Coorey was found guilty by in early 1944, he 
immediately launched an appeal.  It did not matter that the apparent breach was a 
minor one, of failing to deliver the correct number of coupons for rationed goods, 
because in the eyes of the media and authorities he was a criminal.   
 
                                            
23 SMH, 24/10/1936, 15/3/1929. 
24 SMH, 15/6/1927. 
25 David O Friedrichs, Trusted Criminals: White Collar Crime in Contemporary Society, 3rd ed, 
(Belmont: Thompson Higher Education, 2007), p 4. 
26 Smith’s Weekly, 13/3/1943. 
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To risk open condemnation by his peers, Coorey must have thought that the promise 
of financial gain far outweighed the possibility of getting caught.  However it is 
equally possible that he did not set out to break the law, but rather felt that the rules 
regarding rationing did not apply to him, and was more concerned with maintaining a 
profitable business.  As I have already argued in the preceding chapters, he was far 
from alone in behaving in this manner, he simply happened to get caught.  Judge 
Markell who heard Coorey’s appeal to the Federal Court in early 1945 described him 
in the following terms: ‘Mr Coorey is an experienced trader and a shrewd man, and I 
should not be surprised if in February he had not a fair idea of the position in the 
trade in regard to the acquisition of rationed goods [my italics].’27  Thus in purchasing 
the textiles and later selling them on without coupons, no doubt with a significant 
mark-up, Coorey was in one sense being an efficient businessman, (hence the sticky 
norm), but how ethical it was to take advantage of the scarcity of supplies during 
wartime was a matter on which few could agree.28  Thus it was the accusation itself 
of criminality for treachery during wartime carried the heaviest penalty, that of 
personal reputation. 29  
 
                                            
27 Transcript of His Honour Judge Markell’s final judgement on the appeal of Simon Coorey, Sydney 
Quarter Sessions, p 5 27/6/1945.  NAA: A472, W16731. 
28 Memorandum from Deputy Crown Solicitor to Deputy Director of Rationing, Rationing Commission 
regarding the prosecution of Nackey Succar, Simon and Martha Ivy Coorey, 12/10/1943, p 1.  NAA: 
A472, W16731. 
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Among earlier charges against his good name, the more serious accused him of 
theft (of a woman’s fur coat no less), and perjury, though this was later withdrawn.30  
Then there was the accusation of adultery.31  Despite a life that can only be 
described as ‘colourful,’ the Crown in laying the charge of black marketing chose to 
focus only on his former bankruptcy, as if this alone provided an adequate 
explanation for black marketing.32  Perhaps Mr Coorey would have been wise to 
heed the advice in a 1943 edition of Smith’s Weekly which helpfully provided its 
readers with a check list of black marketing behaviour, ‘Do you make use of 
business associates to get things the wartime restrictions have denied to you?  Do 
you think you are clever?  In fact, do you talk about the swift tricks you pull to 
everybody?’33  Thus while the successful Lebanese traders were organising charity 
drives for the war effort, such as the ‘Ugliest Lebanese Man Competition,’ Simon 
Coorey had managed to get himself arrested for black marketing women’s 
undergarments.34  This was hardly the behaviour of a respectable merchant and 
                                            
30 SMH, 11/6/1928, 20/6/1928, 6/12/1932.  He would later sue the Commissioner for Railways for 
‘false imprisonment.’  4/12/1934. 
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perhaps explains why Paul Convy’s book devotes little attention to him, in favour of 
his brother, Anthony.35 
 
Getting arrested for illegally obtaining large quantities of women’s undergarments 
was hardly conducive to respectable merchant behaviour.36  With most men on 
military duty and thus already provided for with a standard kit and ration, women 
would have made the bulk of general purchases.  Civilian men were required to wear 
the unpopular and thus short lived ‘Victory Suit’, with its reduced buttons and 
pockets.37  However, contrary to Michael McKernan’s assumption women were far 
more likely than men to feel the pinch from clothing rationing, given the number of 
men on military duties.38  Indeed as Dymphna Cusack and Florence James’ wartime 
novel Come In Spinner points out there was a ready market for clothing, regardless 
of the price.39  As was argued in Chapter One, the consumerist romance which 
swept Australia, courtesy of the US servicemen stationed in the region meant that 
many women felt that they had to get that desired dress regardless of the 
                                            
35 Convy, The Lebanese Quarter, p 20. 
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consequences and they provided a ready illegal market for clothing material and 
coupons.40   
 
The clothing problem was one which was exacerbated by lack of supply but also by 
the meagre ration afforded for clothing, (112 coupons), which was supposed to last a 
year.41  Thus for many people the idea of having their choice of clothing dictated to 
by an accountant would not do at all.  Although one’s personal circumstances often 
dictated their response to the black market, as Michael McKernan has noted, ‘People 
measured sacrifice against their neighbour’s situation and only “mugs” missed out.’42  
In this sense, Mr Coorey and similar provided a service, meeting a demand which 
the war had created. 
 
Coorey’s shady business behaviour went further and another clue to his behaviour 
can be found in the fact that his business was registered in his wife’s name.  It was 
hardly uncommon in the Lebanese community for women to play a strong role in the 
family business, but the number of actions brought against both Simon and his wife 
suggest a level of complicity in this specific case. 43  It is also likely that Mr Coorey 
had the idea of illegally selling the products when his wife first purchased a large 
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quantity of damaged women’s underwear, and the offending transactions, (by Mr 
Coorey) took place only months apart.  From September 1942 to the 15 February 
1943, (when he was arrested), he traded using his wife’s name to circumvent the 
ration laws, and it was during the latter half of 1942 that the illegal transactions took 
place.  Thus by using his wife’s registration he could purchase merchandise, 
apparently for the business and then sell the stock on to a hawker or trader, and in 
this case Mr Succar.  In his interrogation Coorey argued that the merchandise was 
not worth the published cost, because it was damaged, therefore entitling him to a 
discount, which would hardly have endeared him to the authorities.44  He was far 
from being alone in finding loopholes in corporate law, but he was one of the few that 
happened to get caught and his trial would be an example to potential offenders. 
 
The Crown dropped its case against Mrs Coorey, and also it seems the hawker 
Nackley Succar.  Hauled before the Court of Petty Sessions on 29 May 1944, Simon 
Coorey alone was charged with: ‘Knowingly concerned in the commission of an 
offence against the Black Marketing Act 1942 namely the acquisition of coupons 
from a trader who was prohibited from supply [sic] the said goods.’45  Thus, even 
though it was highly likely that Mrs Coorey was also heavily involved she was 
released because the authorities could not believe that a woman could be seriously 
involved in the wartime black market.  Women may have occasionally bought or sold 
‘something extra for something extra,’ but they did not run organised criminal 
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operations.46  It is also likely that a very public prosecution of a woman would have 
been seen as bad for morale.  In his extensive study of the American wartime black 
market, sociologist Marshall Clinard noted that offenders were almost entirely male, 
and divided into two categories: the minor ‘rationing offenders,’ who seemed to 
follow the pattern of ordinary criminals, young, single and generally poor; while 
‘ration violators were usually businessmen.47  As we have seen the pattern in 
Australia was more complex, rationing was more severe than in America, but less so 
than in Britain and the more desperate the situation the more likely people were to 
be involved, which meant women crossing the boundary into the illegality of the 
informal economy (thought the US was slightly different).  If Australian women were 
to be seen heading criminal operations, it would have represented in the eyes of the 
general public, (and certainly the tabloid press) the moral degradation of society, 
which they were fighting against. 
 
As was the case with most black marketing ordeals media interest was rather patchy 
and began to drop off after the beginning of the trial.48  The exception to this was the 
Sydney Morning Herald which continued to publish a number of detailed articles on 
the case, which suggests that once the initial excitement had died down black 
marketing cases were regarded as essentially local matters.49  The Herald was the 
main reporter on the case and it seems that most of the other publications must have 
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used a similar source.  The most established of Australian newspapers, it preferred 
dry facts in contrast to the sensational reports of the Sun, Truth and the Daily Mirror, 
which were unlikely to have devoted much space to a rather confusing and arduous 
case, and certainly this was to a be the situation in almost all black market cases.50  
The coverage of the case which did exist was generally confined to the home front 
news section in the middle of the paper, thus, no matter how big a racket was, black 
marketing was never really going to overtake the physical war over Europe and in 
the Pacific, while shortages at home were never severe enough to force open revolt, 
as they were in Britain, nor was it almost completely ignored, as it was in the U.S.51  
Not this would have mattered much for Mr Coorey, because even the suggestion of 
black market conduct on the part of a trader was potentially catastrophic.  However 
the Herald did note that the case seemed to bring up some rather ugly problems 
regarding corrupt officials. 
 
We have already seen in Chapter Two how easy it was in a black market 
investigation to make allegations of corruption, given the methods used to make 
arrests, and Mr Coorey’s case proved no exception. His main defence rested on 
allegations of corrupt conduct on behalf of Prices Commission officers.  Messers 
Beaman and Taylor of the Commission were accused of obtaining a false witness 
statement from an illiterate person, (a Mrs Joseph of Orange), by writing one out for 
her and using her cross as proof.  In response to this Mr Beaman argued that ‘The 
statement was interpreted for her,’ though he failed to mention by whom and how 
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this was done.52  Then there was the formal complaint from Mrs Joseph’s solicitor of 
which neither Taylor nor Beaman had any knowledge of.  Perhaps it was lost in the 
sheer volume of wartime communication?  However Mr Hardwick was far from 
finished with the matter, alleging corrupt conduct on behalf of Taylor.  It was alleged 
that Taylor informed Coorey that he could be spared ‘all this trouble at very little 
cost.’53  It seemed that he also demanded a number of shirts from Coorey’s 
warehouse.54 
 
As well as pettiness, there must have been a level of bitterness in those low level 
public servants required to stay behind rather than going to the front; an ‘us and 
them’ mentality.55  Their pay was low, and, unlike those in uniform they did not 
command much respect.  Certainly this would have left some open to corruption 
especially when such large sums of money were being made on the black market.  
Given the specificity of the statements, there seems no reason to believe that they 
were without foundation, especially given the number of similar cases.56  However it 
would appear that such a tactic ultimately failed, given the lack of further references 
to it; suggesting that the matter was well and truly buried.  Finally, after much debate, 
on 4 October 1944, Stipendiary Magistrate Atkinson found Coorey guilty and 
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sentenced him to three months imprisonment.  It could have been far worse, given 
that the maximum penalty called for 12 months incarceration and a fine of up to 
£1,500; although with Mr Coorey’s extensive legal ‘experience,’ he would not go 
down without a fight.57 
 
Another problem which the case seemed to highlight was the poor drafting of the 
legislation, especially in regards to jurisdiction, and we have already seen in Chapter 
Two how local magistrates found their courts overflowing with minor offenders.58  As 
Kay Saunders has noted on the wartime period, ‘In Australia state intervention was 
direct, public and lacking even a pretence of subtlety.’59  But most people provided 
they were not caught on the other side of the law, were willing to accept such 
legislation as necessary for the war effort.  Accordingly Coorey’s legal team based 
their appeal to the Supreme Court of NSW on the confusing nature of the laws: 
that there was no evidence of him being guilty of the offence charged; that 
the Black Marketing Act was ultra vires [in breach of] the Constitution; and 
that the Special Court was not lawfully invested with Federal jurisdiction.60 
Claiming a breach of the Constitution was hardly new, though it certainly highlighted 
the confusion regarding wartime legislation.61  The appeal was also directed against 
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James Comans, senior investigating officer of the Rationing Commission.62  Perhaps 
the vague nature of the laws is not surprising given the speed at which they were 
drafted.  Thus it was often the case that policymakers had to make repeated 
amendments in the hope of clarifying the laws; though in reality this was shutting the 
gate after the horse had bolted, leaving many inconvenienced.63  Beaman and Taylor 
would have likely been under pressure to secure a conviction, and undercover ‘trap’ 
sales were regarded by many including the government as immoral.  Clutching at 
straws, the Coorey’s defence began looking for dirt by demanding access to all files 
on Magistrate Atkinson, hoping to prove political bias, but they found nothing.64 
 
The judiciary itself was far from united over Simon Coorey’s conviction.  Even though 
the Supreme Court of NSW upheld the original conviction on 30 November 1944, 
Justice Jordan abstained, arguing that the Black Marketing Act 1942, which allowed 
the Attorney General with the power to provide fixed penalties was an interference 
with judicial powers and the original fine of £484 was removed.65  Justice Davidson 
also of the Supreme Court argued that the penalty was ‘grossly unjust,’ but that 
Coorey’s conduct fitted the definition of black marketing provided by the 1942 Act.66  
Judge Markell, of the Federal Court which heard Coorey’s final appeal also found the 
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issue to be a grey area.  He noted that the introduction of rationing had caused 
considerable distress among traders.  However Mr Coorey had a period of more than 
five months between their enactment in 1942 and his arrest in 1943 with which to 
familiarise himself with the new laws.67  Mr Coorey, he argued, knew exactly what he 
was doing as early as November 1942 when he had paid a visit to the Rationing 
Commission asking to be supplied with coupons, citing as a reason the new law, 
(effective of that month), forbidding traders to make purchases based only on their 
registration certificates.  The application was denied but a clerk instructed him to 
make a formal application in writing, and someone would be assigned to asses his 
books.68  He also drew attention to the overestimation of the Coorey’s annual 
turnover, (listed at £700), although it is equally plausible, with poor record keeping 
and with many account books missing the figures were simply made up.  Rather 
suspiciously the books for the period in question could not be found.69  However, the 
judge also said that up until September 1942 Coorey’s behaviour had been without 
reproach and he had no objection to releasing him on bail, but the conviction would 
still stand. 
 
Having being sent to Long Bay prison Mr Coorey’s legal team tried moral appeals.  
The afternoon of Judge Markell’s decision Mrs Coorey sent a letter to Mr Beasley, 
acting Attorney General, pleading for release on parole arguing that her husband 
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was elderly, (67 at this time), and in a frail condition.  The legal team also wrote to 
the Federal member for Cook, Thomas Sheenan and stated among other things: 
During the whole of his residence in Redfern Mr Coorey has been an enthusiastic 
supporter of the Labor Party.’70  It was hoped that this connection and his Catholic 
background, (a church to which Mr Coorey also belonged), would offer some 
leverage.  However the bipartisan nature of wartime politics meant that this would 
have had doubtful influence, and by this time the legal team were essentially 
clutching at straws, looking for sympathy.  Take the following example from the same 
letter: 
For the last nine months Mr Coorey has suffered the mental anguish of 
having this threat [of three months imprisonment] hanging over his head.  
The business... is entirely dependent on his being present.  We are 
informed, and we believe that if Mr Coorey is to be absent for a period of 3 
months then the business would be practically worthless on his return.71   
It is interesting to note that the period of three months would be enough to destroy 
the business, especially given that it was registered in his wife’s name.  It seems 
most likely that what was at stake was more than going to prison, but rather his 
sense of reputation. 
 
Perhaps one of most important aspects of this case is the fact that Mr Coorey was 
never proven guilty, and it would have been impossible for him to be found guilty in 
peace time.  True, an investigation was launched by the Rationing Commission 
which charged him with breaching the Black Marketing Act but he was not ‘caught in 
the act’ as it were.  It should also be noted that not only did he pay for the products, 
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in cash, but the required number of coupons was eventually supplied; though this 
was more than four months after the original purchase.  The staggered payment of 
balance owed, (10,704 coupons), suggests that Mr Coorey did not have the sum 
when he made the original purchases, and thus called in favours from family and 
friends.72  Thus as the investigation into the Cooreys’ business continued, coupons 
were eventually surrendered in the hope of maintaining some form of dignity.   
 
It is perhaps fitting for such a character that as soon as he was released, by which 
time the war had been over for more than a year; was to petition the Attorney 
General asking to be excused from paying the 50 guineas in costs.73  Most people 
after having gone through such an ordeal would be simply pleased to be released, 
but not Simon Coorey who took it as a personal affront to his sense of honour that he 
should still have to pay the fine.  A more mundane reason for his petition would be to 
meet the extensive legal costs which he had endured.  We do not know the outcome 
of this appeal, but it is likely given his character, that even sending the letter was a 
source of pride for him.  There are no further references to Mr Coorey in the papers 
and it seems that his wartime ordeal must have cured him of his litigious behaviour.  
Clearly he had recovered enough from his long ordeal to live for another eight years, 
dying at the ripe old age of 75, surrounded by his family in their Strathfield home.74  
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Thus ends the bizarre story of the honourable Simon Coorey and his battle with the 
Ration Commission.   
 
In many respects the Coorey case was typical of wartime behaviour towards the 
black market.  As was argued in Chapter One, the area where the transactions took 
place had a bearing on the attitude of the authorities to the offence.  We have also 
seen in Chapter Two how authorities were hampered on all sides in their attempts to 
stamp out the problem.  In short, most people agreed that such behaviour was 
criminal but did not deserve the penalties imposed.  Certainly reputation is always 
important in white-collar cases, but the normative structure of home front behaviour 
(or ritual of war), which enforced the ‘all in’ mentality, did so by labelling certain 
individual patterns as devious, or even immoral.75  It was this label of ‘black 
marketing’ with its connotations of traitorous behaviour which Mr Coorey tried so 
hard to get removed.  Thus we can already see how socially constructed the term 
black marketing is; something which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Four 
Naming and Shaming: morals and public opinion 
 
And all the racketeers who’ve been stocking away a wad of money out of 
this war.  It’d give me a lot of pleasure to put a bullet through them.  A lot 
fellows think my way too.   
Dymphna Cusack & Florence James Come in Spinner 1951.1 
 
The idea of a wartime ‘black market’ was in essence a social construction.  Moral 
concerns were certainly important as Sydney Butlin states: ‘The popular belief was 
that [black marketing]... was numerous and widespread, but such a belief would 
certainly have been sincerely held even if there had not been a single breach.’2  So 
powerful was the idea that some could live like royalty while others survived in bomb 
shelters on a paupers diet of government rations.  But it never came to this; Australia 
was never invaded, Sydney never experienced a Blitz or a chronic food shortage as 
Londoners had since 1940.  Not that the local black marketeers knew this, and many 
took advantage of food shortages to raise prices.  Thus while Butlin and Shedvin 
argue that it is difficult to know the effect that the illegal sector had on morale, it can 
be argued that with the exception of organised syndicates, of which there were few, 
the issue was unlikely to have had a lasting effect on morale as events like the 
Japanese attack on Sydney Harbour, or the bombing of Darwin which showed the 
nation at its most vulnerable.3  However, while the meaning of the black market was 
by not fixed it tended to oscillate between the vice-ridden black market with its 
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connotations of organised criminality, and the informal economy of, as one 
publication put it ‘getting something extra for something extra.’4 
 
The analysis which follows in this chapter has been divided among a number of 
lines.  It will be argued that official propaganda was mostly half-hearted and the 
government felt that money was better spent in other areas.  Instead it attempted to 
shame offenders with specific legislation.  The media’s response to the problem was 
divided along gender lines, reinforcing certain behaviour norms.  Thus while it was 
generally condoned for men to congregate in the seedy end of the city at all hours of 
the night and marvel at the efficiency of the taxi-grocers of Darlinghurst and 
elsewhere, for women it was not.  It was seen as a zone filled with immorality in vice 
that could threaten the wellbeing of the nation.  As the Australian Women’s Weekly 
noted ‘It’s true that we’re not the criminal operatives of rackets which reap huge 
profits and create shortages where there need be none.’5   
 
Of course the roles could change because the spatial context was just as important 
as gender; for example, a suburban grocer stockpiling tins of biscuits was not seen 
as a black marketeer, he was looking after his customers, which was vital when 
there were so many shortages.  Thus already we can see that the black market was 
one of those areas of crime with many degrees of criminality.  The government had 
the power to direct coverage of cases if it felt the need to do so, which was seldom 
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and official propaganda was half-hearted at best; so instead the job was left to the 
tabloids to provide the moral compass of the Sydney economy.  As we have already 
seen in Mr Coorey’s ordeal, while there were racial patterns to the local black 
market, the authorities were far more interested in the extent of criminality rather 
than perusing any one minority.  Perhaps it was true that the 1942 Black Marketing 
Act ‘was more a propaganda document than an effective restraint’, but it was one 
designed to combat a moral danger.6 
 
As was argued in chapter two, policing was far from simply being the domain of the 
authorities.  Thus the most vocal criticism of the black markets came not from the 
government, which was often unusually silent on the matter, but from numerous 
newspapers which day after day ran stories on the perceived moral decline on the 
home front.7  As Robin Walker has noted the Sydney press from the 1920s onwards 
witnessed a consolidation of ownership into a small oligopoly of businessmen which 
was generally less sympathetic to Labor politics than the non-Labor alternative.8  A 
brief survey of wartime coverage might be useful: at the top of the list was the 
Sydney Morning Herald, controlled at this time by Warwick Fairfax, and the most 
established of the Sydney newspapers, being in print since the early nineteenth 
century.  A close second was the new broadsheet, Frank Packer’s Daily Telegraph, 
which offered itself as a more modern alternative to the Herald.  There was the 
Sydney Sun, which was essentially a bridge between broadsheet and tabloid forms; 
                                            
6 Butlin & Schedvin, The War Economy, 1942-45, p 330. 
7 Butlin & Schedvin, The War Economy, 1942-45, p 567. 
8 R.B Walker, Yesterday’s News: A History of Newspaper Press in New South Wales, 1920-1945, 
(Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1980), p 230. 
79 
 
and then there were the true tabloid forms, the Daily Mirror and Truth, both owned by 
newspaper baron Ezra Norton, whom had been known to back Labor on occasion.9   
 
Finally there was also the profoundly nationalistic and almost always satirical Smith’s 
Weekly, which proclaimed itself as the voice of Australian troops, and the well 
established Bulletin.  Smith’s strictly speaking was closer in format to the Bulletin 
than it was any of the other dailies, and while it was generally left leaning it never 
proclaimed itself a supporter of the Labor Party, though it did not dispute such an 
idea.  In short, wartime papers had been profoundly influenced by the Lord 
Northcliffe model, appealing to the masses, anti-communist, occasionally racist, but 
nevertheless highly popular.   
 
Much of the newspaper coverage of the black market seems to be centred around a 
specific timeframe, the latter half of 1942 before dropping off almost completely in 
1944.  This is explained by the fact that with the exception of petrol, (which used the 
coupon system from 1940), wide-scale rationing was not introduced until the middle 
of 1942, and thus a black market was hardly likely to have existed when most items 
were readily available.  Also, for most editors, until the bombing of Pearl Harbour in 
December 1941 the threat of invasion seemed far away, in Europe as it was in the 
previous war.  However when fortunes began to change the home front was quickly 
militarised from the half-hearted attempt of the early period, to a total affair, and thus 
Australia quickly found itself as a staging ground for US servicemen.  In short, the 
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Second World War did come to Australia; the north was repeatedly bombed and 
Sydney was attacked by midget submarines, making 1942 a year when the enemy 
seemed within close reach.  The Daily Telegraph for example was particularly 
concerned at the ‘opportunity for intimacy’ between young women and Allied 
servicemen during the brown-out. 10  Note the link between the immorality here and 
the moral map presented in Chapter One.  Thus it was in this climate that those who 
sought to profit out of the war restrictions were viewed as not only reducing morale, 
but possibly helping the enemy.  However by the end of 1943 the Japanese advance 
in New Guinea had been halted, and while the danger seemed to have passed the 
people at home seemed more carefree and sought relief from austerity. 
 
Black market activity and sophistication may have increased into 1944, but it was no 
longer regarded by the press as representing a moral threat, and thus with the 
exceptions of large rackets, mentions became less frequent.11  Finally, it is important 
to note that while the media may have taken interest in the black market for a while it 
was never as large a story as the actual conflict itself, and even though almost 
everyone had some first-hand knowledge of the illegal sector, based on the 
Government’s definition it was usually relegated to the home news section in the 
middle of the paper.  It may have been an annoyance and a concern that the nation 
was becoming more lawless, as the Prime Minister remarked on one occasion, but it 
was never going to overtake the blow-by-blow accounts of war correspondents.12   
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Unsurprisingly, the black market was a topic which seemed ripe for popular 
discussion in the many papers of the city and coverage was to range from the 
sensational and satirical, to the pious; though rarely in between.  The Herald, usually 
a mainstay of dry factual reporting declared ‘Black-Marketing and Vice Rampart in 
Sydney’, one November in 1943 and went onto argue the following: 
[Police] believe that agents for... [black market] liquor are concentrating on 
young Servicemen, particularly in the Allied forces.  As a result large 
quantities of liquor are being taken to the eight cabarets and night clubs in 
Sydney.  From 9 p.m. taxis may be seen stopping outside the cabarets 
with girls and Servicemen carrying bottles of liquor.  The liquor not 
consumed in the clubs is later taken into the streets, and drinking is 
continued in doorways and parks... girls of more than 18 [years have often 
defied the Sydney Vice Squad], while under the influence of liquor and in 
the company of soldiers and sailors equally intoxicated.13 
While relations between US Servicemen and Australian women have already been 
covered in some detail by historians (occasionally to the detriment of other issues on 
the home front), the conservative Herald was quick to tap into fears of Temperance 
supporters that alcohol consumption would corrupt the nation’s youth.14  Supplying 
alcohol would thus be seen not only as immoral but possibly even traitorous, 
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because it was blamed, (and not without some foundation) for many moral outrages 
of the war period, from vicious assaults to unwanted pregnancies. 
 
Complaints regarding black market alcohol earned the strongest condemnation, but 
they were also the most reported, because they were the most visible, but it was far 
from the only aspect of the underground economy to which the press drew attention.  
The Sun, apparently quoting a Judge’s ruling on a case of theft involving a number of 
stevedores in October 1943 likened the receivers of these stolen goods to ‘rats.’15  
Cases where the judiciary took a firm stance were rare compared to Britain, where 
food shortages were far more severe, but when they did occur the tabloids were 
quick to make use of them.   
 
Other complaints followed a similar pattern.  Smith’s Weekly declared in one fiery 
editorial in March 1943, that a black market existed in labour practices, whereby 
people were openly flouting the Manpower regulations on useless activities instead 
of aiding the war effort.16  Essentially Smith’s was attacking the industrial action 
taken by many of the wharf unions in favour of better conditions, and being a 
protected industry, the government had little opportunity but to eventually bow down 
to the demands, just as a shopper had to face higher prices brought on by rationing if 
they wanted certain goods.  ‘As, however, there are in trade unscrupulous dealers in 
the black market’, it argued ‘so also there is in labor and unworthy percentage 
‘scabbing’ on the country at this difficult time.  A cleansing of the morally foul is 
                                            
15 Sun, 8/10/1943.  See also: Truth 7/3/1943. 
16 Smith’s Weekly, 13/3/1943. 
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necessary for the health of the body politic.’17  Such publications argued that the war 
was for the improvement of all not for the defence of a few. 
 
The press did occasionally find time for a more satirical angle on the black market.  
Smith’s Weekly for example felt it was doing a civic duty in warning its readers about 
the dangers of cheap red wine, ‘fortified with “metho”, which it referred to as the ‘New 
Red Menace.’18  It went onto argue that ‘plonk’ in all its forms carried high health 
risks: 
Australians as a whole have not developed discriminating palates for 
wine.  Wine, for the most part, is what they drink when they run out of 
beer.  Only way the inexperienced Australian wine-drinker can tell ‘plonk’ 
is by the hangover.  There is a headache in every six penny glass.  
‘Smith’s’ somewhat gingerly and fearful of the consequences checked up, 
and found that... ‘plonk’ was easy to get... It’s about time the Federal 
Government did something to control the trade.19 
Unlike most alcohol, wine was not rationed, because few ever drank it, which quickly 
left the door open for licensees and sly-grog shops to make a fortune.  Much of 
Smith’s dry humour was aimed at Australian servicemen, who made up the bulk of 
its readership, and in a sense, the paper viewed itself as providing for Diggers as the 
Bulletin had done for their forbearers in the previous war.  As we have seen already 
in Chapter One, the black market was viewed with a level of tolerance by some men, 
                                            
17 Smith’s Weekly, 13/3/1943 
18 Smith’s Weekly 19/9/1942.  See also: 10/4/1943 [figure 6]. 
19 In a reference to outlaws and immorality Plonk was also referred to as Pinkie or Red Ned.  Smith’s 
Weekly, 19/9/1942.  See also: 10/4/1943.  For histories of the black market which employ a similar 
attitude to Smith’s and the Bulletin see: M.J Trow, War Crimes: Underworld Britain during the Second 
World War, (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2008); Donald Thomas, The Enemy Within: Hucksters, 
Racketeers, Deserters & Civilians during the Second World War, (New York: New York University 
Press, 2003). On some of the health problems with black market products see Trow, pp 77-8. 
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who in a bohemian fixation with vice felt it made them more worldly citizens.  The 
Bulletin, by this time had grown more respectable, and, unlike its younger relative 
devoted equal attention to literature and sport, and also found time to mock the 
informal sector.  ‘T the R’ composed a short poem on clothing rationing and the 
subsequent prosecution of tailors: 
Woe to the tailor who on suits shall tack/ But one above the statutory 
whack!/ His careless disregard for what’s forbid is like enough to cost 
twenty quid/ And leave him to regret his workmanship/ At once a sadder 
and wiser snip. 20 
In this way an association with the ‘black’ market of cigarettes, spirits, petrol and silk, 
was acceptable to the voyeur, providing he was not caught. 
  
                                            
20 Bulletin, 27/1/1943. 
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[Figure 6] Above: Smith’s Weekly with a more satirical look at home front life 10/4/1943. 
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Of course such publications were just as likely to be scathing in their assessment the 
next week, though it is doubtful whether the editors saw any contradiction.  Certainly 
this would be the case if any reader found themselves exploited from an illicit 
transaction, and thus such behaviour was acceptable so long as they were not 
caught or ripped off.  Fears such as these certainly found their way into Norman 
Lindsay’s rather emotive drawing of the black market, which depicts a young woman, 
(the wife of a serviceman, we are informed) with two tired, barefooted children 
attempting to haggle for produce from an unsympathetic grocer.21  In a fit of male 
chauvinism, very characteristic of the Bulletin, Lindsay wanted readers to ask the 
question, ‘what if it were my wife?’  ‘Exploitation,’ legal theorist Stuart Green notes, is 
one of the most morally ambiguous of white collar offences, because while some 
may argue it is immoral to stockpile and price gouge, both are good business sense; 
and a consumer always has the opportunity not to participate in the deal and in that 
case, will be no better off than before the transaction.  Black market propaganda 
often relied on depicting such transactions as exhortative, (which involves threats) 
and was far more emotive, as opposed to taking advantage of someone; though the 
lines between both categories are somewhat blurred.22 
 
Women’s publications depicted the black market somewhat differently to the 
chauvinism of Smith’s and the Bulletin.  The Australian Women’s Weekly in May 
                                            
21 Bulletin 10/11/1943.[see cover image]  See also: 17/11/1943, by the same artist, which appeared a 
week later. 
22 Stuart Green, Lying, Cheating, Stealing: A Moral Theory of White Collar Crime, (New York, Oxford 
University Press, 2006), pp 96-7. 
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1942, for example lamented the ‘orgy’ of shopping which took place as people 
rushed to secure items before rationing was officially introduced two months later:  
Men and women with rolls of notes grabbed clothing of any size and color 
[sic] and took the lot.  The ugly spectre of black markets looked up as it 
became apparent that some people were buying not just for themselves 
but with an eye to profitable resale for them.  Is this the best we have to 
offer our country in its hour of most desperate need?23 
The generally conservative Women’s Weekly thus maintained the traditional 
stereotype of women as the most likely wasteful consumers, because few other 
publications were as vocal in their condemnation of shopping.  Throughout the war 
the Woman’s Weekly saw its job as reaffirming what it saw as traditional values.24  
Smith’s or other male publications, may have talked about the greed of tax 
avoidance, and alike but shopping was still viewed as a predominantly female 
occupation.25 
 
Of course it was also easier to discuss greed and stockpiling than it was to mention 
the black market, and there was no mention of such conduct for another two years.  
When it did, in July 1944, its tone was more informative than accusative, and told its 
readers that while they may not know it, women were also involved in the black 
market.  It went on to describe the various schemes operating before telling women 
that it was their responsibility to check where their products had come from.26  
Therefore, as we can see the black market for women carried an entirely different set 
                                            
23 Women’s Weekly, 23/4/1942. 
24 Finch, ‘Consuming passions,’ pp 106-7, 110. 
25 Smith’s Weekly, 9/11/1943. 
26 Women’s Weekly, 15/7/1944. 
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of connotations than it did for men and in the same way as pre-marital pregnancy 
and abortion, was unlikely to have been discussed openly unless absolutely 
necessary.  Thus, apart from the scattered references in woman’s publications, most 
would, (openly at least) rely on official propaganda to be informed. 
 
It had often been suggested by critics of the wartime black market that the 
government should embark on a publicity campaign to highlight the dangers of the 
illegal economy.  Indeed, in October 1943, Phyllis Johnson, Secretary of the 
Women’s Committee of the Communist Party of Australia wrote to Customs Minister 
Keane arguing that: ‘In our opinion a campaign to inform unthinking people of the 
unpatriotic character of black market buying is necessary and we urge rigorous 
measures against all agents and racketeers who benefit by taking advantages of the 
war for its own ends.’27  Four days later the minister replied stating that he intended 
to follow up on the suggestion, which also included increasing convictions and 
punishments of persons whom he claimed, ‘wage such a war against society.’28  To 
work with the CPA showed a realisation that the real enemy was Japanese militarism 
or European fascism, a fact which dawned on ministers after the German invasion of 
the USSR in 1941.  However for all the talk of publicity campaigns a wide-scale 
government plan never really occurred, but that did not mean it was silent on the 
matter. 
 
                                            
27 Letter to the Hon. R.V. Keane, Customs Minister, 18/10/1943.  NAA: A367, C53299. 
28 Reply to Secratary, Women’s Committee, Communist Party of Australia 22/10/1943.  NAA: A367, 
C53299. 
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The few scattered posters on the black market which appear to have been 
catalogued seem rather shabby in comparison to the brightly coloured recruitment 
campaigns.29  Indeed many appear to have been put together, perhaps by the 
Ministry of Information, with an aim of doing it as quickly and cheaply as possible.  
However, the Second World War was different in the fact that government 
propaganda were generally less reliant on imperial sentiment so beloved by 
Australian artists during the Great War, and was instead directed to controlling 
behaviour.  Of course as Peter Stanley has noted, there were benefits in simplicity: 
‘A successful poster was capable of only one interpretation.  Most of the posters... 
did not seek a dialogue: they imposed, imparted, and impelled, but did not enquire.’30  
In this sense simplicity was often best in getting the message across.  Often they 
were strategically placed, such as in wartime factories against the temptations of 
pilfering vital supplies and selling them on at a profit.31  
 
 
 
 
[Figure 7] Just letting you know: an example of the Ration Commission’s publicity campaign in a 
Sydney factory (back wall).  Sam Hood, ‘Workshop Scene’ (undated) State Library of NSW: 10657. 
                                            
29 For examples of more extravagant Australian WWII posters see Peter Stanley, (ed.),What did You 
do in the War Daddy?: A visual History of Propaganda Posters, (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 
1983), pp 110-13.  For a recent survey of WWII war posters see: James Aulich, War Posters: 
Weapons of Mass Communication, (London: Thames & Hudson, 2011), chapter 4. 
30 Stanley, ‘What did you do in the War Daddy?,’ pp 14-15. 
31 Sam Hood, (photograph), ‘Workshop Scene’ (undated).  State Library of New South Wales: 10657. 
<http://acms.sl.nsw.gov.au/item/itemLarge.aspx?itemID=13043> (accessed 31/8/2011). 
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In contrast to some of the more famous home front campaigns, the black market 
received comparatively little attention in visual form, both in Australia and overseas; 
instead governments preferred to focus on austerity drives, encouraging citizens not 
to be complacent with their rations.  It is possible that the government was wary of a 
direct campaign, fearing that it may have incited such behaviour and reduced 
morale; although it is equally plausible that the black market was simply not regarded 
as important enough to warrant a high profile campaign.  The few references to this 
activity such as the ‘Squander Bug’ campaign often depicted a criminal looking 
figure, (often supplemented with a demonic insect which encouraged the purchase), 
with an unspecified package in the foreground and implored people to invest their 
money in war savings stamps.32  Thus while the government may not have used a 
high profile propaganda campaign to defeat the black markets it was able to call 
upon the far more complex task of naming and shaming offenders as was codified in 
the legislation and for this it also had the backing of the media. 
 
                                            
32 ‘The Squander Bug Helps the Black Market’ date and author unknown. (leaflet collection), 
Australian War Memorial, Canberra: RC02345 7/8/5; ‘Don’t Touch Black Market Goods.’ (poster), 
author and year unknown, Australian Government.  Held: Imperial War Museum, London. 
<http://www.vads.ac.uk/flarge.php?uid=51964> (accessed 29/8/2011); 
‘Don’t Touch Black Market Goods,’ (poster), author and year unknown, Australian Government.  Held: 
Imperial War Museum, London. 
<http://www.vads.ac.uk/large.php?uid=51891&sos=0> (accessed 29/8/2011);                               
‘Black Marketing is Sabotage,’ (poster), Australian Government, artist and year unknown, Held at 
Imperial War Museum, London                                   
<http://www.vads.ac.uk/large.php?uid=51890&sos=0> (accessed 29/8/2011) 
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[Figures 8 & 9]: The famous Squander Bug campaign targeted both male and female buyers its efforts 
to promote austerity. 
 
The government made little attempt to hide the fact that the new Black Marketing Act 
of 1942 would make an example of offenders.  The government wished to appeal to 
the individual’s sense of honour; that the shame of being branded a black marketeer 
would be enough to deter potential violations of the law.  The 1942 legislation 
required guilty persons to place a notice of conviction on their business premises.  If 
that was not deemed serious enough the government could also order the particulars 
of the case to appear on business letterheads, and direct media coverage on the 
case.33  Such approaches have many benefits, especially for a cash strapped 
system during wartime, as they were, (and are), cheap and easy to initiate, however 
as David Freidrichs points out ‘Social policies based principally on moral outrage can 
                                            
33 Manual of national security legislation as in force on 2nd September, 1945, with annotations setting 
out amendments to 31st December, 1945, 6th ed., (Canberra: L.F. Johnson, Government Printer, 
1945); Argus, 25/2/1942. 
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have unintended harmful consequences for innocent parties.’34  The idea was that 
black marketeers, few of whom had prior convictions, valued their social standing 
within the community, and therefore would object to being labelled as deviants; nor 
would they want to be seen associating with those who openly condoned such 
underclass behaviour, such as professional criminals.35  Thus a wrongful conviction 
would have the potential to destroy someone’s reputation, and more than a few 
convicted black marketeers recoiled when they were found guilty, not that this would 
have mattered much to the government, with the entire nation at war.36  
  
[Figures10 & 11]  Two versions of the few official anti-black marketing posters produced.  Note the 
criminal stereotype lingering in the background.  Author and year unknown.  
                                            
34 David O Friedrichs, Trusted Criminals: White Collar Crime in Contemporary Society, 3rd ed, 
(Belmont: Thompson Higher Education, 2007), pp 308-9; Green, ‘Lying, Cheating, Stealing,’ pp 28-9. 
35 Friedrichs, ‘Trusted Criminals,’ p 4. 
36 See letter from Mrs Coorey to Attorney General, 27/6/1945; minute paper submitted to the 
Governor General recommending remission of sentence, 17/9/1945.  NAA: A472, W16731. 
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The United States also used a similar system, but it was more half-hearted than the 
Australian version.  There was a general concern about unfairly targeting certain 
firms and so it ended up with press stories which were either relegated to the back 
pages of newspapers and trade journals, with few details, or sensational and ill 
informed reports of organised criminal involvement.37  The British system was 
necessarily more rigid.  It had to be with regular bombing since 1940 and the 
increasing losses of merchant shipping in the North Atlantic (on which Britain relied 
for most of its food), which meant that officials were hardly likely to take a 
sympathetic view of the illegal sale of rationed supplies.  Unlike Australia and the 
US, however, British policy was decentralised, and seemed to have been dealt with 
on a case by case basis by the departments concerned.  There may not have been 
an overarching name and shame policy, but it did not need one, instead information 
was simply passed onto the media and public opinion did the rest.38  When it came 
to enforcement Australia occupied the middle ground between Britain and the US; 
the clause was generally accepted, but the judiciary was unwilling to exercise the 
new powers. 
 
There were few cases of the name and shame powers being used in an official 
capacity.  The entire war period saw only one example in Sydney in 1945, a few 
weeks before the capitulation of Japan, which involved the sentencing of Jack 
Mandel, a car dealer of Cleveland Street, Moore Park, who also received six months 
                                            
37 Marshal Clinard, The Black Market: A Study of White Collar Crime,2nd ed, (Montclair, New Jersey: 
Patterson Smith, 1969), pp 79-81.  On the American ‘name and shame’ system more generally see: 
pp 79-88. 
38 On British public opinion see: Thomas, The Enemy Within, pp 133, 135. 
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imprisonment for selling a used car above the fixed price.39  The use of the powers 
so late in the war suggests that the magistrate was under pressure to make an 
example of Mr Mandel, especially given the lack of success in policing the illegal 
used car market.  Thus with media coverage on the wane the government could 
remind people that stern penalties still applied for those who broke the rules.  A 
handful of other cases also displayed the powers but mostly it was left to the media 
which needed little encouragement, to shame the offenders. 40 It is also possible that 
many people required to display the notice simply complied with the court order and 
thus further penalties were not needed. 
 
The Sydney tabloids had always welcomed the opportunity to report on court cases 
and the wartime black market was hardly different.  A common tactic was to promote 
a feeling that the general law-abiding public had been swindled.  In August 1942 the 
Sun sensationally described the illegal trade in petrol coupons as an ‘unfair deal for 
motorists.’41  To be accused of ‘cheating’ during wartime carried with it certain 
accusations of breaking the unspoken codes of behaviour.  These as we have 
already seen in the previous chapters, (particularly in relation to Mr Coorey) were 
based on the premise everyone suffers together for the greater good.  Such codes, 
Green argues can be referred to as prescriptive rules which: ‘are used to guide or 
control behaviour.  They typically include an explicit or implicit “must”, “may”, or may 
not... [For example] “Patrons must wear shoes and a shirt... No smoking 
                                            
39 SMH, 26/7/1945. 
40 Argus 30/3/1943; Cairns Post, 16/7/1945; Canberra Times, 26/2/1946 
41 Sun, 27/8/1942.  See also: Truth, 3/1/1943. 
95 
 
allowed...”’42  As we can see the press made a point of highlighting the breaches of 
these rules when they could, as was noted in Chapter Three with Mr Coorey, the 
wartime situation carried its own normative standards.  The pious tone was to appear 
in almost all black market reports.  Note the following example from a similar case 
also published in the Sun a month later: ‘These people have defrauded the 
community...’ it quoted the prosecution, though the public could rest easy because 
one of the accused, taxi proprietor: ‘[Phil] Maria has been confined to a cold, black 
and nasty cell for nine days without any facilities for washing.’43  Covering the story 
of a small scale petrol racket, which was charged with attempting to defraud the 
Liquid Fuel Regulations out of more than 2,500 coupons, it helpfully provided 
pictures of the accused so the public could identify them.  This supplemented the 
usual information on the age and occupation of the defendants, and quite often as 
well the name and address of the premises where the offence was committed.44   
 
  
                                            
42 Green, Lying, Cheating, Stealing, p 58; Anthony Giddens, Sociology, 5th ed, (Cambridge: Polity, 
2006), p 796; Phillip Smith, ‘Towards a Theory of War as Ritual,’ Theory and Society, 20:1 (February 
1991), pp 103-38. 
43 Sun, 10/9/1942. 
44 Sun, 10/9/1942. 
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Below [Figure 12] the iconic children’s cartoon character Ginger Meggs doing his bit for the war effort 
in thwarting black marketeers.  Date unknown. 
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The tabloid press were not simply reliant on press statements from the Rationing 
Commission, and a favourite method of filling in the blanks on a story was 
investigative reporting, for not only did this provide the paper with an exclusive story 
but it also gave the editors an opportunity to criticise the poor record of officials in 
stamping out the illegal trade.45  However the stern methods of the press, at the 
encouragement of the government were not to everyone’s liking.  ‘T.V.R’ wrote into 
the Herald (which generally did not favour investigative reporting), in August 1942 
concerned that a codified name and shame clause was morally wrong even though 
the conduct of black marketeers was utterly reprehensible: 
To compel anyone so convicted to display in his shop window a placard 
telling everyone that he is a ‘black market’ man is just the Nazi law of 
making every Jew place in his window a placard stating ‘I am a Jew.’  
Such a law is not British, and I am sure no Britisher would stand for it.46 
Of course, as we have already seen that the codified law was simply one aspect of 
the name and shame policy, for it had already been operating in unofficial form for 
some time in the less respectable press.  Doubtless to say, ‘T.V.R’ as a Herald 
reader would have been unlikely to have been familiar with the muck-raking 
journalism of the Lord Northcliffe model. 
 
The black market was the manifestation of a number of wartime concerns though it 
was never as big as it could have been.  For a start, official propaganda was a rather 
low key affair, and the government preferred high profile legislation which targeted 
offenders; they wanted to give the public a face to the racket.  On the legislation itself 
                                            
45 Daily Mirror, 29/10/1943.  
46 SMH, 29/9/1942. 
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the government wanted to be seen as combating the illegal sector with penalties that 
would act as a deterrent to potential offenders but magistrates were reluctant to use 
the name and shame powers on petty offenders and the job was generally left to the 
tabloid media to do the job.  They covered the stories when they felt the need to 
outrage the public, but the problem almost always took a back seat to the war itself.  
The masculine Bulletin and Smith’s did find time to satirise the issue, but were just 
as likely to declare moral degradation in the next issue depending on whether its 
own readers had been fleeced.  In contrast female publications were unlikely to 
discuss the workings of a black market, but informed their readers of its presence in 
the city.  Finally racial concerns hardly played into local coverage at all.  The black 
market was certainly a social construction, and its meaning was highly varied.  The 
term itself was loaded with criminal connotations but these were not always 
exercised or apparent; for criminals used the black market while respectable people 
simply got ‘something extra for something extra.’47 
 
                                            
47 Woman’s Weekly, 15/6/1944. 
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Conclusion 
The black market was many things.  To some it was not only immoral but positively 
traitorous to attempt to circumvent the rationing laws in the hope of getting that 
something extra.  Certainly few in this category would have disagreed with Salt’s 
powerful assertion that ‘In the truest sense of the word the culprit is an agent of the 
enemy.’1  Stockpiling and price gouging were a breach of the implicit norms of home 
front life, namely that the nation should suffer together.  As a crime black marketing 
was more difficult because every demographic of the city was represented; from the 
working-man’s pubs in the C.B.D which never appeared to run out of beer, and 
whose busiest hours appeared to be well after six o’clock closing, to the cheerful 
suburban grocer who kept something extra under the counter for his best customers.  
Some sectors were certainly harder hit by the illegal trade than others, and it seemed 
to many moral reformers that the illegal trade in alcohol had exploded during wartime 
leading to a general increase in vice and criminality.  It was easy to single out the 
alcohol trade because it was the most visible, organised, and, courtesy of the high 
proportion of men in uniform, this was where the largest profits were made.  
However this was simply one aspect of the informal economy. 
 
The black market was different to other perceived crime waves.  Thus even though 
some historians for reasons of simplicity have attempted to lump it together as a 
natural flow on from the ‘razor wars’ of the interwar period, it was something entirely 
different.  Not only were all demographics represented but the majority of offenders 
were simply people in the trade like Mr Coorey with no prior convictions.  This was 
                                            
1 Salt, 6/12/1943, p 34. 
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white-collar crime, not organised crime, for rarely was violence perpetrated, and the 
accused certainly did not market themselves as belonging to a criminal milieu.  Thus 
the question must be asked, what encouraged seemingly honest people to start 
breaking the laws with impunity?  The answer can be found in the fact that most 
cases of black marketing were small scale, with isolated individuals taking the 
opportunity to make extra money on the side.  There certainly was organised 
criminal involvement in the illegal trade, but that which involved professional 
criminals with prior convictions (as opposed to an organised syndicate like Mr 
Blank’s), was mostly confined to the trade in alcohol and other luxury goods and 
generally a minority.   
 
The nature of the wartime situation with its chronic manpower shortages made 
enforcing the regulations a nightmare.  The introduction of rationing in mid 1942 had 
led to increased breaches of the National Security (Prices) Legislation, and by 
September the government had drafted specific legislation to deal with offenders, 
though in reality it was the same as the rationing laws, but with stronger penalties 
added.  The Black Marketing Act was meant to function as a deterrent to potential 
offenders, but magistrates did not like their courts invaded by petty offenders and as 
a general rule, did not use the full powers ascribed to them.  Enforcement was 
further complicated by departmental infighting and in the process the volumes of 
reports produced often went missing.  Nor did it help matters that those called on to 
investigate the problem were poorly paid and received little thanks for their effort and 
as a result, the officious mentality of the Kafkaesque bureaucracy was often 
punctuated by instances of petty corruption.  Other problems were that the incredibly 
vague definition of black marketing, left it open to interpretation, meaning that often 
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the most serious breaches were missed while petty cases were met with the full 
force of the law.  Meanwhile government propaganda sought to make an example of 
offenders, not through posters and slogans, but through a name and shame policy.  
However with the exception of a few isolated cases the official laws were not used, 
and while the tabloids certainly passed moral judgement, the issue was never 
considered bad enough to warrant front page news. 
 
The problem was that not everybody in the community viewed black marketing as a 
severe problem.  As we have seen, men and women behaved differently towards the 
market, but both at some point engaged with it.  Men were certainly more 
comfortable in black market of second hand vehicles and cigarettes, and most of 
these transactions took place in the masculine and bohemian dimensions of the city.  
Women in contrast were more likely to illegally purchase clothing material or 
foodstuffs, but such behaviour was not viewed as black market but as ‘getting 
something extra.’  However it was also geographically divided, and thus the closer to 
the vice districts, the more likely a purchase was to be viewed as black market.  
Certainly, the regulations hit some sectors harder, though many came up with 
ingenious ways to not only beat the authorities but profit out of the war at the same 
time; the taxi-grocers provide a good example.  Finally, as the case of Mr Coorey 
demonstrates, race per se was not a primary concern of authorities.  In short the 
black market represented a moral grey area in which the participants constantly 
fluctuated between acceptable and unacceptable forms of conduct.   
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The black market provides a unique opportunity to not only examine socio-economic 
relations on the home front, but provides a greater understanding of white-collar 
crime within an historical framework.  In my argument I have attempted to move 
beyond the material explanations provided by so many economic historians to 
examine the role of the people themselves and how they viewed their conduct.  Of 
course the vague definition of black marketing coupled with wartime shortages 
meant that many turned to the black markets, but each had their own excuses and 
reasons for doing so.  In short the black market presented society with one of those 
grey areas where the line between acceptable and illegal conduct was often ‘sticky.’  
However when so many ordinary citizens (and indeed the press) felt duty-bound to 
inform on their neighbours, this became something else; moral policing for the good 
of the nation.  The regulation of certain behaviours always provides certain ethical 
dilemmas and my case study provides an excellent example of this.  Hopefully this 
thesis will provide the basis for more comprehensive research to be carried out on 
this fascinating topic. 
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